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INTRODUCTION
Free trade is currently the "glass of fashion."' Indeed, GATT's2
free trade paradigm seems guaranteed a hegemonic role in global af-
fairs for the foreseeable future. Free Tradism seeks to reduce or elimi-
nate tariffs and other state imposed barriers to trade. To date, its most
vigorous expression is to be found in bilateral and regional trade agree-
ments which establish relatively free trading zones between and among
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1. William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene 1: "The expectancy and rose of
the fair state, The glass of fashion and the mould of form."
2. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was most recently re-
constituted by the new World Trade Organizations (WTO) and the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (Act) signed into law by President Clinton on Dec. 8, 1994. Pub. L.
No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4804 (1994). The Act implements more than twenty attendant
agreements negotiated by the United States and its trading partners. The principal
agreement consummated by the Uruguay Round negotiation replaced the pre-existing
GATT organization and established a World Trade Organization (WTO). With regard
to the various agreements annexed to the principal agreement, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade Anti-dumping Code is most relevant to the subject matter of this
article. Effective January 1, 1995, the new Code supersedes the 1979 GATT Anti-
dumping Code for the United States and at least 80 other nations. See Donald Harri-
son and Judith A. Ott, Trade Regulation, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Apr. 3,
1995, p. 35, col. 1-4 (discussing the most salient changes the new agreement will effect
in U.S. law). GATT provides a framework of agreed-upon codes of conduct for inter-
national trading relationships. Although it is a multilateral structure, it permits signa-
tories to form bilateral free trade zones; although it contemplates reduction or elimina-
tion of trade barriers, it permits individual members to impose anti-dumping and
countervailing duties upon unfairly traded imports. See GATT art. XXIV; art. VI.
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the parties. The free trade agreement momentum is fueled, in part, by
the perception that reciprocal free trading arrangements will facilitate
the signatories' ability to compete in an increasingly aggressive global
market.' In the United States, the new era of free trade was ushered in
by the U.S. - Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988 (hereinafter,
FTA).4 The FTA, in turn, has served as a prototype for the North
American Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter, NAFTA).5 While the
free trade movement falls short of garnering unanimous support in the
U.S.,6 the U.S. will most likely be a party to an ever-widening sphere
3. See GATT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: A TRANSATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR A
STRONGER REGIME (Reinhard Rode ed., Westview Press, 1990) (suggesting that com-
peting free trade blocs simply replicate and reflect policies grounded in nationalistic
protectionism). But see THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A NEW
FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE AMERICAS (Judith H.
Bello and Alan F. Holmer eds., The American Bar Association, 1994) (expressing that
these bilateral and regional agreements serve as stepping stones to world trade integra-
tion and segue into a global free trade regime). See generally Barbara Bucholtz, Coase
and the Control of Transboundary Pollution: The Sale of Hydroelectricity under the
United States - Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988, 18 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
279, 296 n.98 (1991).
4. 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988). The implementing legislation is found in the United
States - Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988). The FTA was the second free trade agreement to which
the U.S. was a party. Bucholtz, supra note 3, at 317 n.195.
5. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8 and 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
1993 WL 572901; reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). The implementing legislation is
found in the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L.
103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
Free trade agreements are not self-executing treaties. They are entered into by the
President and require Congressional approval of implementing legislation before they
become law in the U.S. The implementing legislation incorporates the trade agreement
under consideration and, if not disapproved by Congress, becomes federal law. The
approval process is delineated in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
19 U.S.C. § 2902-2903 (1988). See infra notes 57, 71-74 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Pratap Chatterjee, Heads We Win, Tails You Lose, INTER PRESS
SERVICE GLOBAL INFORMATION NETWORK, 1993 WL 2531877 (arguing that the free
trade agenda is elitist and merely a rhetorical mask for big business interests); Robert
Benson, Free Trade as an Extremist Ideology: The Case of NAFTA, 17 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 555 (1994), Symposium, Trade and the Environment: The Role of
Regional Trade Agreements, Special Focus: North American Free Trade Agreement,
5 GEO INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 515 (1993) (free tradism has become "a classic extremist
ideology" which evinces a clear policy choice in favor of traditional commercial con-
cerns at the expense of competing societal interests, such as the environment); Jeremy
Brecher and Tom Costello, The Lilliput Strategy: Taking on the Multinationals, THE
NATION, Dec. 19, 1994, at 757 (bilateral institutions created by free trade accords will
undermine or even eliminate democratic control of national economies); Harvey Berk-
man, As GATT Gains, Will States Wane?, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Nov. 14,
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of free trade arrangements.7 Similarly, it is safe to assume that the
FTA will continue to serve as the prototypical legal mechanism for fu-
ture trading bloc arrangements. With that in mind, it seems prudent to
reassess the efficacy of this seminal legal framework and to inquire
whether it is achieving its intended results or whether some revision or
fine-tuning might be advisable.
Among the most notable provisions of the FTA is Chapter 19
which replaces judicial review of anti-dumping and countervailing duty
(AD/CVD) assessments with binational panel review. 8 During the
Congressional debates on the FTA,9 the panel review mechanism was
challenged on the grounds that it was unconstitutional, but Canada in-
sisted that U.S. rejection of the binational panel provision would be a
1994, at Al, col. 1 (consumer and labor interests will be sacrificed under the auspices
of an all-powerful multi-national free trade bureaucracy); Michael Janofsky, Trade
Pact Casts Shadow for Garment Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1994, at A8, col. 1;
Thomas R. Donahue, The Case Against a North American Free Trade Agreement, 26
COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 93 (1991) (that bilateral institutions created by free trade
accords will undermine - indeed - eliminate democratic control of national economies).
In summary, the detractors challenge the dominant claim of proponents that free trade
will inure to the benefit of all economies by rewarding efficiency and thereby maximiz-
ing prosperity. (See, William P. Alford, Introduction: The North American Free Trade
Agreement and the Need for Candor, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 293 (1993). While the
voices in opposition to NAFTA cited above arise primarily from U.S. interest groups, it
is notable and, perhaps instructive, that parallel arguments were expressed by Cana-
dian interests in opposition to the FTA. Id. at 301 n.40. See also Conference Proceed-
ings, The Law and Economics of Environmental Regulation in the Canada/U.S. Con-
text, 18 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 1 (1992); Bucholtz, supra note 3, at 297 n.99.
7. Infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
8. Briefly, anti-dumping and countervailing duty statutes are non-tariff barriers to
trade. They are devices by which national governments seek to protect their domestic
industries from what they perceive to be unfair trade practices by importers or foreign
governments. The statutes seek to dilute the deleterious effect of these practices on
local markets by imposing compensatory duties on the subject imports. "Dumping"
occurs when an importer sells its product in the domestic market at a lower price than
the same product is sold in the importer's home market. The practice is considered to
be unfair because it undercuts the domestic competitors' market share by selling at less
than fair value. Anti-dumping regulations impose a duty to reflect the difference be-
tween the importer's price and the fair price. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(3)(C) (1988); 19
U.S.C. § 1673(2)(B) (1987). Countervailing duties seek to offset the unfair price ad-
vantage to imported goods which are the beneficiaries of subsidies granted to importers
by their governments. To counteract the unfair benefit the subsidy affords the cost of
producing the import, a duty is assessed in the amount of the net subsidy. 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1671-77(g) (1987). See infra notes 30 and 33 and accompanying text. Title 19 is
discussed in more detail below. See infra, notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
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deal breaker.10 Congress was convinced to approve Chapter 19 and its
panel review provision after expert witnesses assured Congressional
committees that the mechanism could pass Constitutional muster 1 and
that the impact of the panel mechanism on the domestic economy and
legal regime would be minimal.12 The "minimal impact" argument can
10. The binational panel review provision was actually an "eleventh hour"
fallback solution to the parties' failure to reach agreement on a unified or harmonized
AD/CVD legal regime. Jean Anderson & Jonathan T. Fried, The Canada - U.S. Free
Trade Agreement in Operation, 17 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 397, 408 (1991). Negotiators found
themselves "under the gun" of imminent expiration of the "fast track" procedure and
the provision was, by all accounts, hastily drafted. See, e.g., Andrew Kayumi Rosa, Old
Wine, New Skins: NAFTA and the Evolution of International Trade Dispute Resolu-
tion, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 255 n.19 (1993). But the binational panel provision became
non-negotiable as Canada insisted that without it Canadian imports would be jeopard-
ized by biased application of U.S. AD/CVD laws. See Negotiation of United States -
Canada Free Trade Agreement, Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th
Cong.; 2d Sess. 41 (1986) (statement of Ambassador Clayton Yeutter, U.S. Trade
Representative); see also, 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 28 at 905 (July 15, 1987),
(statement of Manitoba Premier Howard Pawley to the effect that without bilateral
panel review as a replacement for domestic judicial review, the FTA was unacceptable
to Canadians). Indeed, even after ratification of the FTA and actual dispute resolution
pursuant to Title 19, AD/CVD disputes continue to be a sore point in the U.S. - Can-
ada relations. And, as will be discussed subsequently, the Softwood Lumber cases have
proved particularly problematic in that regard. See, e.g., Daphne Bramhan, Canada
Gets Short End of the Stick: U.S. Ruling on Softwood Ignores Free Trade Deal, VAN-
COUVER SUN, May 16, 1992 at Al.; Robert Hage, Dispute Settlement under the Can-
ada - United States Free Trade Agreement, 1990 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 361, 363.
11. On May 20, 1988, the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, received tes-
timony from Professor Harold Bruff (University of Texas School of Law), Professor
Andreas Lowenfeld (New York University School of Law), Andrew Vance (on behalf
of the Customs and International Trade Bar Association), Stewart Baker and Jeffery
Bialos (representing the International Trade Administration, Department of Com-
merce), Ambassador Alan F. Holmer (Deputy U.S. Trade Representative), and John
0. McGinnis (Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice). On April 28, 1988, the
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, conducted hearings and
received testimony from Hon. Sam Gibbons (Chair, Subcommittee on Trade of the
Committee on Ways and Means), Hon. Alan Holmer, Andrew Vance, Joseph Griffin
(on behalf of the American Bar Association), and Professor Harold Bruff. Prior
thereto, the Committee solicited written opinions from Professor Louis Henkin (Colum-
bia Univ. School of Law), Professor David Shapiro (Harvard University Law School),
and Professor Andreas Lowenfeld. The resulting consensus was that the binational
panel mechanism which precluded judicial review of private litigant challenges to AD/
CVD agency determinations was constitutional. However, Professor Shapiro and An-
drew Vance expressed concerns about the provision's constitutionality. Similarly, Sena-
tors Dennis De Concini and Howell T. Heflin filed dissenting views on the issue in the
Committee Report. S. Rep. No. 509, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2395 (hereinafter, Senate Comm. Hearings].
12. Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d
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be summarized as follows: 1) the binational panel review provision of
Chapter 19 is merely a temporary measure to preserve the rights of
private litigants while the two governments resolve their differences
over a proposed harmonized dispute resolution regime; 2) in the ab-
sence of a harmonized regime, Canada was unwilling to abide by what
it perceived to be a biased or arbitrary administration of U.S. unfair
trade laws; however, the U.S. refused to exempt Canada from the ad-
ministration of those laws; therefore Chapter 19's binational panel re-
view became the "eleventh hour" stop-gap measure of compromise; 3)
the binational panel system is not a radical departure from the existing
legal regime because panel review would be bound by judicial prece-
dent; 4) Canada shares a common legal tradition with the U.S.; and 5)
U.S. AD/CVD orders against Canada typically average a mere two
per year.'" This de minimus argument which was so effectively
presented to the Congressional committees by Reagan Administration
witnesses in 1988 takes on a different cast and hue in 1995 against a
background of proliferating free trade accords to which the U.S. is a
party. As noted above, the FTA, including its Chapter 19 bilateral
panel review mechanism, was replicated 14 in NAFTA to which the U.
S., Canada, and Mexico are parties. Chile has recently been chosen to
become the "Fourth Amigo" of NAFTA. The announcement was made
at the conclusion of a three-day summit meeting attended by 34 leaders
of Western Hemisphere nations in December, 1994.1 The avowed pur-
pose of the December summit was to commit participant nations to a
"Free Trade Area of the Americas" by the year 2005."6 On the other
Sess., May 20, 1988, S. Hrg. 100-1081, Serial No. J. - 100-62 (U.S. Gov't. Printing
Office). "It is also important to have some perspective on the numbers here. Of over
700 U.S. AD/CVD cases filed since 1980, only 31 involved Canada, and only 13 of
those 31 led to orders. On average, that is fewer than two U.S. orders against Canada
annually. And those orders cover less than $600 million of our approximately $70 bil-
lion in annual imports from Canada. United States - Canada cases are also only a
small fraction, less than 6 percent, of the AD/CVD appeals before the Court of Inter-
national Trade and less than 1 percent of the total cases before the Court of Interna-
tional Trade." Id. at 64 (statement of Ms. Anderson).
13. Id. See also Abraham Rotstein, Trading Down, 14 CAN. Bus. L.J. 399, 401
(1988) (explaining that the desire to be exempt from U.S. trade laws was the driving
force behind Canadian support for a free trade agreement).
14. Changes in Article 19 in NAFTA were minor and are discussed below at
notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
15. David E. Sanger, Chile is Admitted as North American Free Trade Partner,
N.Y. TIMES INTERNATIONAL, Dec. 12, 1994, at Al. Formal negotiations on the terms
of Chile's admission to NAFTA were initiated on Jun. 7, 1995. Calvin Simms, Chile
Fears a Delay in Trade-Bloc Entry, N.Y. TIMES INTERNATIONAL, May 5, 1995, at C4.
16. David E. Sanger, U.S. Envisions An Expansion of Free Trade in Hemisphere,
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side of the globe, the U.S. is a party to a multi-national effort to estab-
lish the world's largest free trading area in the Asia-Pacific region. On
November 16, 1994, seventeen nations (Australia, the United States,
Canada, Mexico, Japan, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, In-
donesia, Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Papua
New Guinea, and New Zealand) committed themselves to a free trade
confederation to be known as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
or APEC. APEC is reported to encompass more than half of the
world's economy. The parties have targeted the year 2010 for the com-
mencement of its operation as a free trade zone.1" The proliferation of
free trade accords to which the U.S. is a signatory is clearly proceeding
apace. And, in the wake of that momentum, the strength of the "mini-
mal impact" argument 18 - whatever its merits in 1988 - is dramatically
reduced.
The remaining premise advanced by the Reagan Administration in
support of the binational panel review mechanism was its constitution-
ality. During the debate on the FTA, constitutional challenges to bina-
tional panel review posed three distinct questions: does supplanting ju-
dicial review of AD/CVD determinations with binational panel review
violate the Appointments Clause, Article III, or the Due Process
Clause?19 This article revisits those questions and argues that - to para-
N.Y. TIMES INTERNATIONAL, Dec. 8, 1994, at A7. Already in place are two smaller
regional pacts in Latin America: the Mercosur (or Common Market of the South) and
the Group of Three. Both of these pacts took effect on January 1, 1995. Brazil, Argen-
tina and Uruguay, which together represent two-thirds of South American commerce
and investment, are signatories to the Mercosur accord, while Mexico, Colombia and
Venezuela comprise the Group of Three. The member-nations of the two blocs are
currently seeking to merge and create a South American free trade bloc. James
Brooke, On Eve of Miami Summit Talks, U.S Comes Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES INTER-
NATIONAL, Dec. 9, 1994, at A4.
17. Andrew Pollack, Opening Asia's Door, N.Y. TIMES INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 16,
1994, at A6. Six members of the group have already formed a more limited free trade
bloc: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN. Andrew Pollack, Asia-
Pacific Countries Near Agreement on Trade, N.Y. TIMES INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 15,
1994, at Al.
18. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
19. These issues were addressed by Congress during its fast-track consideration of
the FTA. See, e.g., United States - Canada Free Trade Agreement Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administrator or Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1988) (hereinafter House Comm.
Hearings); Senate Comm. Hearings, supra note 11. The issues were also considered in
several law review articles following ratification of the FTA. See, e.g., Peter Huston,
Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Dispute Settlement under the United States -
Canada Free Trade Agreement: Is the Process Constitutional?, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
529 (1990).
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phrase Justice Rehnquist2 ° - they do not yield easy answers. The facil-
ity with which these questions were considered during the FTA debate
is attributable more to the political appeal of the free trade paradigm
and the time constraints of the fast-track procedure21 than to the com-
pelling logic of the arguments advanced. This article then argues that,
even assuming the constitutionality of binational panel review, Chapter
19 gives away more than was necessary or prudent in order to achieve
its intended goal of securing Canadian participation in a bilateral free
trade accord. To concede the facial constitutionality of the provision is
not to vouch for its substantive merit. The thesis of this article is that
there is no serious impediment to affording binational panels Article III
protection. The reasons the Article III safeguards of life tenure and
undiminished salary were found essential for an independent judiciary
apply equally to a binational panel system as it is utilized in ever-
widening free trade zones. Indeed, the absence of Article III safeguards
threatens the efficacy of free trade accords.
Part I presents a framework analysis of the nation's tariff and
trade laws and their interface with GATT, the FTA and NAFTA. Part
II considers the constitutional issues raised during fast track considera-
tion of the FTA as well as the Administration's failsafe "minimal im-
pact" argument. The focus then narrows to take a closer look at Article
III case law and its applicability to binational panel review. Part III
chronicles the actual operation of the binational panel review mecha-
nism by targeting the Softwood Lumber case. 22 Part IV concludes with
the proposal that binational panel members be granted the salary and
tenure protections of Article III judges.
I. UNITED STATES TRADE LAWS AND TRADE AGREEMENTS
A. Historical Development of U.S. Tariff and AD/CVD Laws.
1. Evolution of Judicial AD/CVD Cases
The Constitution confers upon Congress the "power to lay and col-
20. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 91
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The question presented in Northern Pipeline was
"'whether the assignment by Congress to bankruptcy judges of the jurisdiction granted
in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 . .. of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 violates Art. III of the Consti-
tution.' " Id. at 89 (Rehnquist, J., concurring, quoting the Northern Pipeline plurality
opinion at 52). Justice Rehnquist opined that "[t]he cases dealing with the authority of
Congress to create courts other than by use of its power under Art. III do not admit of
easy synthesis." Id. at 91. See infra notes 158-175 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 204-252 and accompanying text.
1995]
182 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 19
lect taxes, duties, imports and excise" as well as the power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations."2 3 Congress was prompt to exercise
these powers: following adoption of the Constitution, its next legislative
action was to pass a statute mandating the collection of duties on im-
ports.24 The priority of that enactment is not surprising in light of the
fact that, until 1913 and the adoption of the income tax amendment,
2 5
tariffs provided the principal source of income for the federal
government.
A fortiori, the assessment of customs duties on imports pursuant
to the 1789 Act gave rise to disputes. Challenges to duty assessments
were initially litigated in federal courts of general jurisdiction. In 1890,
Congress established a Board of General Appraisers under the Depart-
ment of the Treasury as a special tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction
over cases challenging customs assessments.26 The Board was replaced
in 1926 by the United States Customs Court. The Customs Court was
originally an Article I court under the Department of Justice2" but was
elevated to Article III status in 1956.28 In 1979, Congress made signifi-
cant procedural changes in customs litigation by requiring, inter alia,
formal filing of a civil action in the U.S. Customs Court to initiate a
challenge to a duty assessment. But no attempt was made to broaden
the jurisdiction or remedial powers of what remained, essentially, an
administrative tribunal in spite of its formal status as an Article III
court."
During the decade of the 1970s, significant demands were made on
the customs court system as the case load of international trade suits
multiplied, particularly with regard to anti-dumping and countervailing
duty cases."0 In response to the increasing case load pressure, to the
23. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24. Tariff Act of July 4, 1789, 1 Stat. 24 (1789). Customs districts were estab-
lished by Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29 (1789).
25. "The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived .... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI.
26. Customs Administrative Act, ch. 407, 26 Stat. 131 (1890) (amended by ch.
16, 38 Stat. 181 (1913); superseded by ch. 411, 44 Stat. 669 (1926)). The nine mem-
bers of the Board were appointed to life tenure status by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. Appeals of the Board's decisions were taken to the federal
circuit courts until 1909 when the Court of Customs Appeals was established.
27. Customs Administrative Act of 1926, ch. 411, 44 Stat. 669 (1926).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1956) (amended by 1980 Acts, Section 701 of Pub. L. No.
96-417, as amended Pub. L. No. 96-542, § 1, 94 Stat. 3209 (1980)).
29. Customs Court Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-271, 84 Stat. 274 (1970). See
also Ruth F. Sturm, Customs: Past, Present and Future, 37 FED. B. NEwS J. 151
(1990) (giving an overview of the development of the customs court system).
30. See supra note 8. See also Sturm, supra note 29. The Brookings Institute
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evolving intricacies in customs litigation, and to certain ambiguities
concerning Customs Court jurisdiction, Congress in 1979 and 1980 en-
acted significant changes in existing law which served to expand the
jurisdiction and power of the Customs Court. 1 In 1979, the Customs
Court was given the power to grant injunctive relief; in 1980, it was
given authority to assess money damages and to provide complete equi-
table relief. The 1980 Act also changed the name of the court to the
United States Court of International Trade (hereinafter, CIT). 2 The
present status of the CIT is described by those changes wrought by
Congress in 1979 and 1980. It is the CIT which has exclusive authority
to hear appeals of AD/CVD assessments.
2. Current Administrative Process for AD/CVD Assessments under
U.S. Law
The purpose of anti-dumping and countervailing duty law is to pe-
nalize imports sold substantially below actual market value 8 by impos-
reported that, by 1980, 20% of domestically produced U.S. goods were protected by
AD/CVD and other non-tariff impediments to imported goods. ROBERT B. REICH, TA-
LES OF NEW AMERICA 57 (Time Books, 1987) (citing ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, CAN
AMERICA COMPETE? (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institute, 1984)). The demand for
non-tariff protection by U.S. producers was created by the fact that import prices un-
dercut domestic prices, resulting in a U.S. trade deficit as U.S. consumers flocked to
the lower priced imported goods. REICH, supra at 57 (citing International Trade Com-
mission, Annual Reports (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Of-
fice 1980-1985)). Reich notes that "[iun 1979 sixty-two petitions to restrict imports
were filed with the U.S International Trade Commission; by 1984 the number had
more than tripled." Id.
Reich's point is that in the long run, the domestic malaise is due less to foreign
unfair trade practices than to the ineptitude of the American private sector to reward
companies for making long term investments in developing the expertise and sophisti-
cated technological skills of the American work force. That point was made more re-
cently in HEDRICK SMITH, RETHINKING AMERICA 196-215 (Random House, 1995).
31. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-391, 93 Stat. 144 (1979);
The Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980).
32. While the 1980 Act specifically granted Article III powers to the CIT, it ap-
pears to have failed in its avowed mission to "eliminate the considerable jurisdictional
confusion" and to "increase the availability of judicial review in the field of interna-
tional trade in a manner which results in uniformity without sacrificing the expeditious
resolution of import-related disputes." Sen. Dennis De Concini, 126 CONG. REC. 27,
063 (1980). See also Hon. Gregory W. Carman, The Jurisdiction of the United States
Court of International Trade.: A Dilemma for Potential Litigants, 22 STETSON L. REV.
157, n.27 and accompanying text (1992) (quoting Sen. De Concini and discussing the
continuing ambiguity of the jurisdictional reach of the CIT).
33. Valuation standards and techniques for determining fair value and unfair
practices are beyond the scope of this article. For a general discussion of these issues,
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ing a duty upon them and, thereby, leveling the playing field for their
domestic competitors.84 The procedure for ascertaining unfair practice
and imposing duties is set forth in Title VII of the Tariff Act of 193085
as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 197936 and the Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984.87 Current law establishes a bifurcated system of
investigation, 8 administered by the International Trade Administration
of the Department of Commerce (ITA or Commerce) and the Interna-
see Presley L. Warner, Canada - United States Free Trade: The Case for Replacing
Anti-dumping with Antitrust, 23 LAW & POLICY INT'L Bus. 791 (1992); Donald B.
Cameron and Susan M. Crawford, An Overview of the Anti-dumping and Counter-
vailing Duty Amendments: A New Protectionism? 20 LAW & POLICY INT'L Bus. 471
(1989).
34. See supra note 8. Duties imposed for dumping are equal to the difference
between the price charged in an import's home market and the price charged in the
U.S. market. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1983 & Supp. 1989). Duties imposed to counter-
vail subsidies are calculated as the amount of the net subsidy. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671
(1983 & Supp. 1989).
35. To establish intent under the first anti-dumping law, a party had to prove
"[sluch act or acts be done with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the
United States, or of preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States,
or of restraining or monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in
the United States." Anti-dumping Duty Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982). This
standard of proof was very difficult to meet.
The intent element was eliminated in the 1921 Act which replaced the 1916 Act.
Anti-dumping Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 11 (1921) (codified in its amended form at 19
U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976)). In turn, the 1921 Act was repealed and replaced by the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979). The first
countervailing duty law was enacted in 1890. Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244 § 237, 26
Stat. 584 (1890). Prior to 1974, the Secretary of the Treasury had discretionary au-
thority to impose duties on imports supported by foreign subsidies. That discretionary
power was subsequently eliminated by the Trade Acts of 1974 and 1979. Trade Act of
1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1976); Trade Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677
(1979). Section 1671(a) requires the imposition of a duty upon a finding of the exis-
tence of a subsidy.
For a general discussion of anti-dumping and countervailing duty law, see 3 J.
PATTISON, ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES (1984); Jameson, The Ad-
ministration of the U.S. Countervailing Duty Laws with Regard to Domestic Subsi-
dies, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 59 (1985); Litigation before the United States
Court of International Trade, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV., 437, 450-451 (1981).
36. Id.
37. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984). The
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(1988), did not significantly change the existing administrative law. See Cameron and
Crawford, supra note 33, at 471 (noting that the 1988 Act codifies existing Commerce
Department administrative practice).
38. The first bifurcated administrative procedure was established by the 1921 Act.
Supra note 35.
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tional Trade Commission (ITC), an independent federal agency. Inves-
tigations of alleged unfair trading practices may be initiated either by
Commerce or by private litigants who are qualified as interested par-
ties. 9 Once a proceeding has been initiated, the ITA investigates and
makes a preliminary determination of unfair price or unfair subsidy.
Upon a finding of an unfair practice (dumping or subsidy), the case is
considered by the ITC which makes a determination as to whether the
unfair practice has or will materially injure the U.S. industry. If that
finding is affirmative, Commerce directs Customs to collect the appro-
priate duty on the import at issue."0 Challenges to duties imposed are
reviewed by the CIT which, as noted above, has exclusive jurisdiction
of AD/CVD appeals. 41 Based upon traditional standards of review of
administrative agency actions, 2 the CIT may affirm or remand to ei-
ther the ITA or the ITC for further proceedings. Decisions of the CIT
may be appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and
then to the U.S. Supreme Court."3
B. A Comparison of U.S. and Canadian AD/CVD Law
The Canadian anti-dumping law predates its U.S. counterpart by
a decade. 44 The Canadian law, first enacted in 1904 as Section Six of
the Customs Tariff Act, was enacted in response to allegations of
dumping by U.S. imports. 45 The law was revised in 1968 to bring it
into conformity with GATT's Anti-dumping Code." The law was
changed again in 1984 when the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA)
39. Interested parties are defined under the Act as 1) U.S. manufacturers, pro-
ducers, or wholesalers of the product at issue; 2) a union or equivalent representative
group from labor in the industry producing the product at issue; or 3) a trade associa-
tion of vendors of the product at issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2631 (1995).
40. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(a)(20)(A) (1995). For a more complete discussion of the
process, see Huston, supra note 19. See also Nam H. Paik, American Lamb Company
v. United States: Application of the Reasonable Indication Standard, 9 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 191 (1988).
41. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
42. The applicable standards are "arbitrary and capricious," "abuse of discre-
tion," and "against the weight of evidence." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1995).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1995).
44. An Act to Amend the Customs Tariff, ch. 11, § 19, 1904 S.C. (1897).
45. See generally Mark Gillis, The United States - Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment and Its Effect on Anti-dumping/Countervailing Duty Law.: Does the Interim
Measure Beat the Long Term Solution?, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNATIONAL L.J. 700 n.44
(1992).
46. The 1979 Act accomplished that task under U.S law. See supra note 35.
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replaced the 1968 Act.47
SIMA established an administrative procedure which is similar to
the U.S process. Both countries provide for a bifurcated investigative
regime as required by GATT."" In Canada, unfair practice investiga-
tions and determinations are made by the Deputy Minister of National
Revenue for Customs and Excise, 9 the counterpart of the ITA in the
U.S. Following an affirmative finding, the case is reviewed by the Ca-
nadian International Trade Tribunal for a "material injury" determi-
nation50 (the role assumed by the ITC in the United States).
The Federal Court of Appeal, 51 like its U.S. counterpart the CIT,
has exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to these determinations. Ulti-
mate appeals may be taken to the Supreme Court of Canada.52
Similarities in federal tariff regimes and the common bond of an
English legal ancestry have done little to eliminate discord between the
two countries on AD/CVD issues.58 Indeed, the dispute over Canadian
softwood lumber industry imports to the United States, discussed in
some detail below, and Canadian perceptions that agency enforcement
of U.S. AD/CVD laws are egregiously biased and combined to produce
a major impetus for ratification of the FTA.5 4
C. The U.S. - Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988 (FTA)
1. Ratification and Implementation Process - U.S.
The Trade Act of 1974 authorized the President "to harmonize,
reduce or eliminate barriers" which are deemed to place an undue bur-
den on our trade with other nations. 5 The 1984 Trade and Tariff Act
47. Special Import Measure Act, ch.25, 1984 S.C. 739 (1984), as amended by
Customs Act, ch. 1, 1986 S.C. 1 (1986).
48. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, 31 U.S.T. 4919, 26 Supp. B.I.S.D. 171 (1979). This 1979 Code was
superseded by the new GATT Anti-dumping Code. See supra note 2.
49. SIMA §§ 38-41.
50. Id.
51. Federal Court Act, R.S.C., § 28 at F-7 (Can. 1985) (prior to 1990
amendment).
52. Id. at § 31. For a more complete discussion of the two countries' AD/CVD
laws, see Warner, supra note 33.
53. See MacDonald, An Overview of the Prospects for Sectoral Integration:L The
View from Canada, 10 CA.--S. L.J. 3 (1985) (discussing their disputatious trade
history).
54. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. GATT, alone, proved an inade-
quate vehicle for reducing trade barriers. See Gillis, supra note 45.
55. Trade Act of 1974 § 102(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1982).
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granted the President express authority to enter into free trade agree-
ments,5 which Congress must consider on a "fast track" basis. 7 Fast
track analysis essentially gives Congress 60 legislative days to accept or
reject "as is" the President's proposed legislation for implementing a
free trade agreement. Amendments to the legislative proposal are not
in order.58 The benefits afforded the Executive by the fast-track process
are obvious: the negotiated terms are firm. Congressional opprobrium
can only take the form of outright rejection of the entire implementing
legislation of the accord. The integrity of the negotiation process is pre-
served. 9 Conversely, Congressional deliberation in approving the U.S.-
Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988 must be
assessed in the context of these fast track constraints of time and
amendment. 0
56. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 § 401, 19 U.S.C. § 2112(b)(a) (1995). But note
that these Trade Agreements do not become effective unless implementing bills are
enacted by both Houses of Congress. 19 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1) (1995).
57. 19 U.S.C. § 2112(c), (e), § 2191 (1995). The "fast track" provides an expe-
dited procedure for consideration of trade agreements whereby 1) the foreign nation
must request negotiation for a trade agreement; 2) the President must give Congress 90
days notice of his intent to enter an agreement before becoming a signatory to it; 3) the
President must submit a proposed draft of an implementation bill along with state-
ments as to the purpose of the agreement and how it will change existing U.S. law; and
4) Congress has sixty (60) legislative days to accept or reject the implementing bill
without amendment. A simple majority vote of each House is required for approval.
For a more detailed description of the "fast track" procedure, see Alan Holmer and
Judith Bello, U.S. Trade and Policy Series No. 20: The Fast Track Debate: A Pre-
scription for Pragmatism, 26 INT'L. LAW. 183 (1992).
58. Pursuant to Section 102 of the Trade and Tariff Act, on September 26, 1985,
Prime Minister Mulroney requested that Canada and the U.S. enter into negotiations
for the purpose of concluding a free trade accord. On Dec. 10, 1985, President Reagan
notified Congress of his intent to entertain the request for negotiations. On October 3,
1987, President Reagan gave Congress notice that he intended to enter into a free
trade agreement with Canada. On January 2, 1988, President Reagan and Prime Min-
ister Mulroney signed the FTA; whereupon the President submitted the proposed im-
plementing bill, along with the requisite supporting documents, to Congress for consid-
eration. The bill was approved and the FTA took effect on January 1, 1989. See U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hearings Before the Senate Jud. Comm., 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 76-87 (1988).
59. A primary concern of Congress was the constitutionality of the bilateral re-
view panels established by Chapter 19 of the FTA. Pursuant to the "fast track" pro-
cess, Congress had no power to amend Chapter 19. The content of Congressional hear-
ings on the issue is cited above. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 104-116 and accompanying text.
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2. Provisions of the FTA
a. General Coverage
The express objectives of the FTA are identified in Article 102 as
"(a) eliminate barriers to trade in goods and services ... ; (b) facilitate
conditions of fair competition; (c) significantly liberal[ize] conditions
for investment; (d) establish effective procedure[s] to administer the
Agreement and resolve disputes; and (e) lay the foundation for further
bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation." 61 Thus, the FTA was designed
as an ambitious and comprehensive plan to advance free trade. It pro-
vides for a phased-in process for the elimination of all tariffs over a 10-
year period.62 In addition, the FTA provides for the harmonization of
technical standards in the two countries' laws and regulations with re-
gard to a number of industries including automotive, energy, invest-
ment, financial services, wine and liquor, and agriculture.6"
The FTA established two dispute resolution processes: Chapter 18
covers disputes with regard to interpretation of the FTA and Chapter
19, the problematic and innovative chapter which is the focus of this
article, provides for bilateral review panels in lieu of judicial review of
AD/CVD assessment challenges.
b. Chapter 19: Binational Panel Review
Article 1904 of the FTA establishes the structure for binational
panel review. Each nation will retain its own AD/CVD laws and ad-
ministrative procedure whereby AD/CVD duties are assessed. Chal-
lenges to those assessments will be reviewed, not by each nation's desig-
nated appellate court (the CIT in the U.S. and the Federal Court of
Appeal in Canada, with ultimate appeal, in each instance, to the na-
tion's Supreme Court),64 but by a five-member panel of experts. 65 Re-
61. U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hearings Before the Senate Jud.
Comm., 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 76-87 (1988).
62. FTA, art. 401. Tariffs on certain products (leather, furs, motorcycles, rum,
whiskey, telecommunications equipment, and automatic data processing equipment)
were eliminated at the outset. Tariffs on other products (after-market automotive parts,
petroleum, paper, printed materials, machinery, chemicals, furniture, and certain musi-
cal instruments) were scheduled for a five year elimination. Goods giving rise to con-
tentious trade issues (wood, lead, zinc, rubber, plastics, textiles, apparel, footwear, alco-
hol, appliances, watches, precision instruments, fish, and agricultural products) were
scheduled for a 10-year tariff phase-out.
63. FTA, chs. 6-17.
64. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
65. Each nation will select two members from a pre-existing roster of fifty candi-
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quests for panel review may come from either government, sui sponte,
or on behalf of any requesting party who would have had standing to
compel judicial review.16 Administration experts who testified before
Congressional committees emphasized that the panel is bound by the
administrative record in its review of the case and must apply the AD/
CVD law of the assessing country. Jean Anderson, speaking on behalf
of the Reagan Administration, put it this way:
In a U.S. case, the panel will apply U.S. AD/CVD law which
has been incorporated into the FTA for this purpose, including
the statute, the legislative history, regulations, administrative
practice, and U.S. judicial precedent. The panel would apply
the same standard of judicial review as the CIT would apply.
The panel cannot substitute its judgment for the agencies, [sic]
either. It can affirm the decision, or can conclude that the
agency made a mistake, and in the latter case, Commerce
[ITA] or the ITC would make a new determination just as they
do on remand from the CIT. . . . [Tihe panel decisions are
binding only with respect to the particular matter before the
panel. Consequently, neither a later panel nor a United States
court reviewing a non-Canadian case would be obliged to follow
67the panel's decision ....
Decisions of the panel may be appealed to an "extraordinary chal-
lenge" committee only on the grounds that 1) a panelist violated speci-
fied rules of conduct; 2) the panel significantly deviated from a funda-
dates which is composed of 25 candidates selected by the executive branches of the
Canadian and U.S. governments. (The U.S. Trade Representative selects 25 candidates
with the approval of the Senate Finance and the House Ways and Means Committee; a
selection board appointed by the Minister of Trade selects 25 candidates on behalf of
Canada.) The two governments jointly select the fifth member of the panel or, in the
absence of agreement, the four panelists select the fifth. If the panelists cannot agree,
the fifth member is chosen by lot. FTA Annex 1901.2; S. Hrg. 100-1081, supra note
58, at 72-73 (testimony of Jean Anderson).
66. FTA, Art. 1904(5). If no Party requests panel review, judicial review of a
AD/CVD assessment remains available in the domestic court which has jurisdiction to
hear such matters.
67. See Testimony of Jean Anderson, supra note 65, at 64-65. The standard of
review for issues raised by a U.S. assessment is a determination as to whether the
agency finding is supported by "substantial evidence on the record," is "arbitrary, ca-
pricious [or] an abuse of discretion;" or "otherwise not in accordance with law." 19
U.S.C. § 15161(b)(1). The provision that panel review was merely a substitute for
judicial review was reinforced by section 102 of the Agreement which provides that the
Agreement must be consistent with U.S. law to be given effect.
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mental rule of procedure; or 3) the panel manifestly exceeded its
powers, authority, or jurisdiction. As to each ground, the appellant
must also show that the panel's action "materially affected the panel's
decision and threatens the integrity of the panel review process." 68 The
three members of the Extraordinary Challenge Committee are selected
from a roster of present and past members of each nation's judiciary. 9
Finally, Chapter 19 does not preclude judicial review of constitutional
challenges to the implementing legislation or constitutional issues
raised in AD/CVD assessment appeals.70 Since the effective date of the
FTA in 1989, binational panels have been convened on a regular basis
to hear and resolve assessment disputes. In addition, Chapter 19 served
as the prototype for NAFTA's AD/CVD dispute resolution
mechanism.
D. The North American Free Trade Agreement
1. Negotiations and Ratification of NAFTA
Trilateral negotiations leading to NAFTA commenced on June 12,
1991.7 Although the fast track process for implementing trade agree-
ments was to terminate by June 1, 1991, the law provided for a two-
year extension of the process.72 On May 23, 1991, President Bush re-
ceived the extension for purposes of negotiating both NAFTA and the
Uruguay Round Agreements (which culminated in the WTO) under
the fast track process.7 3 The United States, Canada, and Mexico con-
cluded NAFTA negotiations on September 15, 1992.71 On December
68. Id. at 73.
69. Id.
70. Id. Ultimately the parties envisioned that a harmonized system would replace
the binational panel review provision. Article 1906 provides that the parties will have
five years from the effective date of the FTA to develop a unified AD/CVD assessment
system; the five-year term can be extended to seven years; if no agreement has been
reached by the end of the seven-year term, either party may terminate the FTA by
giving the other party six months notice. 27 I.L.M. 293, 390 (1988).
71. Daniel S. Sullivan, Effective International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
and the Necessary Condition of Liberal Democracy, 81 GEO. L.J. 2369, n.167 (1993).
72. 19 U.S.C. § 2903(b)(1); Section 1102, Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-418).
73. Public Citizen v. USTR, 970 F.2d 916, 917 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing Re-
port to the Congress on the Extension of Fast Track Procedures, Mar. 1, 1991, and
noting that, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2903(b)(1)(B), the extension came into effect
because neither house voted to disapprove the extension). See 137 CONG. REc. H3588-
89 (daily ed. May 23, 1991).
74. North American Free Trade Agreement, Sept. 15, 1992 (Gov't Printing Off.
Doc. 1992-330-817/70635).
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17, 1992, President Bush, Prime Minister Mulroney, and President
Salinas executed the Agreement. 75 Bill Clinton became President
before Congress acted on the Agreement. Following his inauguration in
January, 1993, President Clinton became the somewhat ambivalent
NAFTA torchbearer to run the gauntlet of Congressional "fast track"
debates."6 The debate over NAFTA, unlike the FTA debate, was vigor-
ous and contentious. Broadly speaking, critics voiced concerns about
the environment, 77 human rights issues,7 8 and the economic impact of
NAFTA on the U.S. labor force. 9 Congress, through its committees,
75. Judith Bello and Alan F. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 23:
Reflections on the NAFTA as a Turning Point in American Foreign Policy, 28 INT'L
LAW. 425, 428 (1994).
76. Id. at 428, 430.
77. See Benson, supra note 6 (discussing the major issues raised in opposition to
NAFTA); ROBERT A. PASTOR, INTEGRATION WITH MEXICO: OPERATIONS FOR U.S.
POLICY (New York 1993) (discussing positions in support of NAFTA); H.R. Rep. No.
103-361 (I), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2552 (Con-
gressional consideration of the issues). The position of the Bush Administration is sum-
marized by Rep. Robert T. Matsui in a Symposium on Free Trade and Democratic
Values: NAFTA's Effect on Human Rights, 27 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 791 (1994). For
specific discussions on environmental repercussions of NAFTA, see Carl F. Schwenker,
Protecting the Environment and U.S. Competitiveness in the Era of Free Trade: A
Proposal, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1355 (1993); Symposium, Trade and the Environment: The
Role of Regional Trade Agreements, Special Focus: North American Free Trade
Agreement, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 515 (1993).
Not only was NAFTA challenged on grounds that it would negatively impact U.S.
environmental laws and standards, the fast track process of NAFTA itself was chal-
lenged on the grounds that it was a proposal for legislation or a major Federal action
which could significantly affect the quality of the human environment and, therefore,
mandated compliance with NEPA and its Environmental Impact Statement require-
ment. See Public Citizen, 970 F.2d 916.
78. Differences between the U.S. legal system and that of Mexico took two forms:
1) that Mexico was not a liberal democracy; that it was authoritarian and undemocrat-
ically ruled under a one-party system; and 2) that its legal traditions were markedly
different from those of the U.S. and Canada where legal traditions emphasize demo-
cratic ideals and standards of individual liberties. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
stated during "fast track" debate that "[w]e are for the first time being asked to con-
sider a free-trade agreement with a country that is not free .... We simply cannot
pretend that Mexico is a democracy with an independent judiciary." Sullivan, supra
note 71, n.180 (quoting Senator Moynihan). 137 LONG. REC. S6628, S6629 (daily ed.
May 24, 1991).
79. For a discussion of labor issues, see Thomas Howard, Free Trade Between the
United States and Mexico: Minimizing the Adverse Effects on American Workers, 18
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 507 (1992); United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement:
Hearings Before the Comm. on Finance U.S. Senate, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1991)
(statement of Thomas R. Donahue, Secretary Treasurer, AFL-CIO); Peter Morici,
Grasping the Benefits of NAFTA, 92 CURRENT HISTORY 49 (1993); William B. Rich-
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addressed itself to these large social policy issues in the 1993 NAFTA
debate, rather than to the narrower, legalistic focus of the 1988 FTA
debate. The focus of the 1988 debate was the constitutionality of sup-
planting judicial review with binational panel review of AD/CVD as-
sessments. 80 Nevertheless, there is a notable connection between one of
the major issues identified in the NAFTA debate and the de minimus
argument advanced by the Reagan Administration in support of the
FTA's binational panel review provision.
The 1988 argument described the panel system as comprised of
governments with a common legal tradition whose member-panelists
would simply apply the domestic law and follow the domestic legal
precedents of the Parties' pre-existing AD/CVD process. The argu-
ment added that, in any case, instances of U.S.-Canadian AD/CVD
disputes are rare. 81 The addition of Mexico, with a significantly differ-
ent legal tradition, can only serve to diminish the strength of that
argument.
2. Anti-dumping/Countervailing Duty Dispute Resolution Under
NAFTA
NAFTA, in most respects, replicates the FTA. As with most
Chapters of NAFTA, the AD/CVD dispute resolution provisions made
few changes in FTA's Chapter 19 model.
Chapter 19 of NAFTA permits the parties to retain their own
AD/CVD regimes.82 Disputes over assessments made pursuant to a
Party's domestic AD/CVD law may be appealed to a binational panel
which replaces domestic judicial review, but must apply the law of the
domestic government.83 In all these respects, Chapter 19 of NAFTA
mirrors Chapter 19 of the FTA.
Only three provisions diverge from the FTA model. Under the
FTA, the parties must devise a harmonized system within seven years
from the effective date of the Agreement or the Agreement may be
ardson, Congressional Approval of NAFTA, 15 Lov L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 115
(1992); Kevin R. Johnson, Free Trade and Closed Borders: NAFTA and Mexican
Immigration to the United States, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 937 (1994). For a discussion
of the side agreements on non-trade issues appended to NAFTA as a result of these
debates, see Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law: Non-Trade Is-
sues in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 24 LAW & POLICY INT'L Bus. 391
(1993).
80. See supra note 77.
81. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
82. NAFTA, supra note 5, at art. 1904.
83. Id. at art. 1904(3).
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terminated by either Party upon six months notice.8 Under NAFTA,
Parties are required to consult with each other regarding AD/CVD is-
sues annually.88 A second difference is the inclusion of a safeguard
mechanism in NAFTA8" whereby a Party has standing to assert that
another Party's domestic law interferes with NAFTA's panel review
process. The charging Party is entitled to consultations and, ultimately,
to the investigation and determination by a special committee.87 If the
special committee8" finds in favor of the charging Party, the Parties
have 60 days to resolve the dispute. If no resolution is reached, the
charging Party may suspend operations of Article 1904 panels with re-
spect to the other Party.8 9 There is no comparable safeguard mecha-
nism for protecting the operation of the binational panel review system
in the FTA. The third change in NAFTA's version concerns provisions
on the make-up and the standard and scope of review for Extraordinary
Challenge Committees (ECCs). Under NAFTA, grounds for ECC re-
view explicitly include failure of a binational panel to apply the appro-
priate standard of review under domestic law. Failure to apply the cor-
rect standard would be considered an action manifestly exceeding the
panel's powers, authority, or jurisdiction. 90
The scope of review provision has also been modified. Under
NAFTA, ECCs are directed to revisit and examine the legal and fac-
tual reasoning which underpins a panel's decision; to look beyond the
question of whether the panel simply applied the correct standard of
review. In enlarging the scope of review, NAFTA also expanded the
time in which an ECC can consider a challenge.9" Finally, there is a
provision in NAFTA that does not appear in its FTA counterpart:
84. See supra note 70. Discussion on the interface of the two harmonization provi-
sions is minimal. See Canada Set to Negotiate Anti-dumping Changes in Trilateral
Free Trade Talks, Official Says, 8 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 441 (Mar. 20, 1991). In
any case the issue appears to be moot because NAFTA suspends FTA pursuant to
Section 107 of the NAFTA Implementation Act.
85. NAFTA, supra note 5, at art. 1904.
86. Id. at art. 1905.
87. Id. at art. 1905.1-.2. Interference with the panel review process is deemed to
occur whenever a domestic law prevents the convening of a panel, interferes with its
deliberations, or prevents implementation of its determinations.
88. Special committee members are selected according to the process used to form
an Extraordinary Challenge Committee and according to procedures set forth in Annex
1904.13. Id. at art. 1905.4-.5.
89. Id. at art. 1905(9).
90. Id. at art. 1904 13(a)(iii). The House Report on its NAFTA deliberations
strongly suggests that the federal regulation "Certain Softwood Lumber Products" 951
Fed. Reg. 37453 (1986) inspired this provision.
91. NAFTA, supra note 5, at annex 1904.13.
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NAFTA requires that the Parties select judges and former judges for
the panel roster "to the fullest extent practicable. '92 These changes
wrought in the FTA prototype by its successor, NAFTA, have the ap-
pearance of granting the dispute resolution panels and committees
more of the characteristics of the judiciary in the common law tradi-
tion. Simultaneously, and somewhat anomalously, the evolutionary pro-
cess is taking place under the auspices of an Agreement which extends
membership to a Party with a very different legal tradition, one which
is not grounded in common law precepts and perspectives.
3. The Daunting Task of Applying the Domestic (Importing)
Country's Law
Binational panel members are charged with the responsibility of
deciding whether, in a particular case, an AD/CVD assessment by the
domestic or importing government "was in accordance with the anti-
dumping or countervailing duty law of the importing Party."98 Panel
deliberations are proscribed by the standards of review and general le-
gal principles that a reviewing court in the domestic (importing) coun-
try would apply to the case. 9' As discussed above,95 this aspect of panel
review was an important part of the Reagan Administration's de mini-
mus argument: FTA's Chapter 19 would not affect U.S. AD/CVD law
because its panels would merely apply U.S. AD/CVD law. The argu-
ment bears haunting similarities to legal formalism's simplistic view of
the judicial process and suffers from similar superficialities: "finding"
and "applying" the law inescapably involves more than the ministerial
functions those terms seem to suggest. The function is inevitably re-
duced to the problem of interpretation. The problem is endemic to the
judicial function. It is exacerbated in the FTA/NAFTA setting by the
fact that panelists are drawn from different legal traditions. For exam-
ple, under the FTA there has been a recurring problem regarding Ca-
nadian and American perceptions of the proper standard of review. As
discussed earlier, the U.S. standard of review is "arbitrary and capri-
cious," "abuse of discretion," "unsupported by substantial evidence on
the record," or "otherwise not in accordance with the law."9 By con-
trast, the Canadian standard of review is much more liberal and more
92. Id. at Annex 1901.2. Both NAFTA and the FTA require the selection of
judges and former judges for the ECC roster. Id. at annex 1904.13.
93. NAFTA, supra note 5, at art. 1904.
94. NAFTA, supra note 5, at art. 1904(3).
95. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
96. Id.
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deferential to the agency.9 7
The standard of review under Mexican law' 8 is stricter than its
Canadian counterpart. The issue of differing standards of review
presents more than an academic conundrum: it has already resulted in
a highly contentious review of a U.S. AD/CVD assessment against Ca-
nadian importers. 9  To date, these disputes have arisen under the FTA
between countries that share a common law tradition. There will be
many opportunities for disputes over interpretation of domestic law
under NAFTA between countries who do not have the benefit of a
shared legal tradition. The inclusion of Mexico 00 in NAFTA is prob-
lematic for "applying" the law of the importing country. The addition
of Chile will be even more complex. The inclusion of other Western
Hemisphere countries could increase the difficulties dramatically.10 1 To
paraphrase one commentator, "where legal traditions ... are so mark-
edly different ... [the] legal training and law practice [of panelists in
their own respective countries] ... is more likely to hinder rather than
aid . . . [panelists] in understanding their neighbor's legal system." ' 2
The danger is that these differences in legal perceptions could under-
mine confidence in the credibility and legitimacy of the legal process.103
In hindsight, the de minimus argument on which the Reagan Adminis-
tration relied is not compelling. The final argument advanced in sup-
97. American Farm Bureau Federation v. Canadian Import Tribunal, 2 S.C.R.
1324 (1990).
98. Article 238 of the C6digo Fiscal de la Federaci6n.
99. James F. Smith, Confronting Differences in the United States and Mexican
Legal Systems, I U.S.-MEx. L.J. 85 (1993) (discussing the dispute between the ITC
and the panel over the U.S. standard of review in Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork); 13
INT'L TRADE REP. (daily ed. BNA) 1291 (USA - 89-1904-11, Jan. 22, 1991).
[Tihere is a better chance of reversal under a stricter standard of review, the
application of stricter standards to the United States and Mexico could result
in more cases being appealed from those countries than from Canada. This
imbalance could lead to perceptions of unfairness and thereby undermine the
legitimacy of the system [citations omitted].
David Huntington, Settling Disputed under the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 407, at n.186-7 (discussing another fallout from the
differences in national standards of review).
100. See Smith, supra note 99 (discussing the Mexican legal tradition in detail).
101. In the event both a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Zone and an Asia-
Pacific Free Trade Zone become realities, the polyphony of differing legal traditions
could become a cacophony. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
102. Smith, supra note 99, at 85.
103. See Sullivan, supra note 71, at n.186 which states "[t]he author viewed first-
hand an example of how a seeming lack of shared norms results in skepticism about the
legitimacy of a legal process."
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port of the panel review system is its constitutionality.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE BINATIONAL REVIEW
PANEL PROVISION OF THE FTA
A. Fast Track Analysis by Congress.
During the debate on the FTA in 1988, Congress considered the
constitutionality of the proposed binational panel review system as a
replacement for traditional domestic judicial review. 04 By contrast,
NAFTA debates focused on larger social issues. The panel review sys-
tem was considered the "centerpiece" of the FTA1 5 and its inclusion
was pivotal to the Agreement reached by President Reagan and Prime
Minister Mulroney.106 Further, the House Committee on the Judiciary
concluded that the panel review system would benefit the United States
in the following four respects: (1) Although the panels would simply
''apply" the same standards and general legal principles of review as a
court would, the panels were mandated to issue a final determination
within 315 days,10 7 thus affording the parties economic advantages.1 0 8
(2) The Committee viewed these panels as a temporary vehicle for per-
mitting the free trade accord to be operational while the parties famil-
iarize themselves with each others' legal regimes. The ultimate goal is
to achieve a harmonized legal regime within five to seven years. 09 (3)
Panel review reached cases otherwise not subject to judicial review
under Canadian law." 0 (4) Private parties could reduce the expense of
attorney fees, in certain cases, by obtaining the assistance of govern-
ment legal staff."'
Both houses of Congress gave attention to the constitutional issues
raised by Chapter 19's panel review regime, soliciting testimony and
statements from various academic experts, practitioners, and trade and
104. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
105. Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 816, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess., Rept. 100-816 Part 4 (1988).
106. Supra note 10 and accompanying text.
107. FTA, supra note 4, at art. 1911.
108. Report of the Committee, supra note 105 (citing HORLICK, OLIVER AND
STEGER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS IN THE CANADA - UNITED STATES FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT: THE GLOBAL IMPACT at n.6 (J. Schott, M. Smith ed. 1988)).
William K. Ince, Michele C. Sherman, Binational Panel Reviews under Article 19 of
the U.S. Canada Free Trade Agreement: A Novel Approach, 37 FED. Bus. NEWS & J.
136, n.20 (1990) (reporting that CIT review takes, on average, almost two years).
109. Id. at note 7.
110. Id. at note 8.
Ill. Id. at note 9.
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administration representatives." Following hearings and deliberations
Congress concluded that binational panel review, as a substitute for
judicial review of AD/CVD assessments, was constitutional.'1I
Most of the witnesses called to testify before Congressional Com-
mittees found the Chapter passed constitutional muster.1 The issues
discussed before the Committees concerned constitutional implications
arising from the Appointments Clause, Article III, Due Process, and
general Separation of Powers considerations. As was the case with ex-
pert opinion submitted prior to passage of the FTA, commentaries pub-
lished subsequently have generally held it is likely the Supreme Court
would hold Chapter 19 constitutional. 1 5 While these commentaries
have substantial merit, the possibility of the Supreme Court striking
down Chapter 19 on grounds of unconstitutionality should not be dis-
missed out of hand. The Supreme Court will claim jurisdiction over a
dispute if it finds the issues to be judicial.'16 In addition, the increasing
112. A list of experts called by the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives is found in the Committee's Report, supra note 77; a list of experts
called by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary is found in that Committee's Report,
supra note 11.
113. Senators Howell T. Heflin and Dennis De Concini felt constrained to issue
separate statements for the record, voicing their concerns about Chapter 19's constitu-
tionality. Specifically, they challenged the argument, developed infra, that binational
panels will be operating pursuant to international law, and, thereby, escaping Article
III protection. They asserted that, in fact, AD/CVD assessment issues arise from do-
mestic law and fall, therefore, arguably within the "protected core" of Article III juris-
diction. "The individuals who have shared their concerns with the Judiciary Committee
regarding the Panel proposal have noted that matters subject to suit at common law or
in equity or admiralty which unquestionably include import duty cases are at the 'pro-
tected core' of Article III Judicial powers." S. Rep. No. 100-509, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2464 (1988) (citations omitted).
114. Notable dissents to the consensus were recorded by Professor David Shapiro
of Harvard Law School in his letter to Congressman Robert Kastenmeier found in S.
Rep. No. 501, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1988) reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2395
(1988). A detailed opposition to the proposed Chapter 19 panels was submitted by the
Customs & International Trade Bar Association, reprinted in 134 Cong. Rec. S8650,
S8650 (daily ed. June 25, 1988).
115. See e.g., Huston, supra note 19, at 529; Thomas W. Bark, The Binational
Panel Mechanism for Reviewing United States - Canadian Anti-dumping and Coun-
tervailing Duty Determinations: A Constitutional Dilemma? 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 681
(1989); Gilad Y. Ohana, The Constitutionality of Chapter Nineteen of the United
States - Canada Free Trade Agreement: Article III and the Minimum Scope of Judi-
cial Review, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 897 (1989).
116. Most notably, in 1995, the Supreme Court struck down a statute which pro-
vided an extension of the statute of limitations for suits alleging fraud in the sale of
securities brought pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
pending at the time. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 115 S. Ct. 1446 (1995). Prior to
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number and complexity of cases handled by review panels of the Chap-
ter 19 model in which the U.S. is a signatory only serves to weaken
pro-constitutionality arguments since the arguments are premised on
the notion that the review panel will have small dockets and will apply
the law of the importing country. Given this background, the constitu-
tionality issues will be revisited.
B. The Constitutionality of Chapter 19 Binational Review Panel
System
1. The Presumption of Constitutionality
Many commentators begin the analysis by offering a presumption
in favor of Chapter 19's constitutionality." 7  The presumption is
grounded in the synergism found in the President's treaty-making
power" 8 and Congressional power to regulate commerce." 9 The combi-
nation of the Article I power to regulate commerce with foreign nations
(i.e. assessing import duties) and the Article II power over foreign af-
fairs (i.e. entering into free trade agreements) is particularly compel-
ling. These powers are being exercised pursuant to the express Con-
gressional directive to the President'2" to enter into an Agreement,
Plaut, the Supreme Court in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,
501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991), held that "[1litigation instituted pursuant to § 10(b) and
rule 10(b)(5) .. .must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts
constituting the violation and within three years after such violation." On the same day
Lampf was decided the Court ruled in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501
U.S. 529 (1991), that new law enunciated by the Court would apply not only prospec-
tively but also retroactively to cases pending. Pursuant to the joint effect of these three
cases, many petitioner's cases were dismissed as time-barred. As a prophylactic mea-
sure, Congress enacted § 27A of the Securities Exchange Act extending the limitation
period to preserve pending cases that would have been considered timely filed under the
law prior to Lampf. It was this extension, § 27A, that the Court found in Plaut to be
an unconstitutional contravention of the Separation of Powers doctrine in that it com-
pelled federal courts to reopen cases for which a final judgment had been rendered.
Plaut at 1456. Though the facts at issue in Plaut bear little resemblance to the Chap-
ter 19 conundrum, Plaut remains instructive for its strenuous defense of judicial power
in the face of what it perceived as an encroachment by the legislative branch into its
constitutional domain.
117. See, e.g., supra note 11, Statement of Harold H. Bruff; John S. Redditt Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Texas, before the Senate Committee of the Judiciary, S.
Hrg. 100-1081, Huston, supra, note 19.
118. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
120. Trade Act of 1974 and 1984 Trade and Tariff Act which gave the President
authority to enter into free trade agreements. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying
text.
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which is then ratified by Congress through implementing legislation.12'
Dames & Moore v. Regan presented the Supreme Court with a case
where both powers were exercised in tandem, and the Court held that
the presumption is strong "and the burden of persuasion would rest
heavily upon any who might attack it."' 2 The Dames & Moore case
involved executive agreements which transferred claims by private liti-
gants against Iran pending in U.S. federal courts to an international
tribunal. These executive agreements were designed to resolve the Ira-
nian hostage crisis. The Court upheld the transfer to an international
tribunal not only on the grounds of the presumption accorded pooled
powers of the executive and legislative branches exercised in foreign
affairs, but also because of the international character of the adjudica-
tion. The Court noted that the use of international agreements to ad-
dress private claims against foreign governments dates at least back to
the case of the "Wilmington Packet" in 1799.112 The linchpin of the
case, then, would appear to be the international character of the adju-
dication. Most commentators have asserted that the FTA is an interna-
tional law and that the Chapter 19 panels are internationally cast. 24
Some, however, have questioned the use of precedents like the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission (at issue in Dames & Moore) and the
binational Boundary Commission (as in the Jay Treaty) asserting that
they are not analogous to the Chapter 19 panel system.' 25 These critics
assert:
We are not aware of any precedent where the United States
has statutorily agreed to force its citizens or those entitled to
the protection of its laws to go to a binational panel to construe
United States laws and Federal agencies actions with the ulti-
mate determination of those rights or obligations under United
States statutes in that binational panel. 2
Thus, while there is a presumption in support of the validity of the
Chapter 19 panel review system, resting on the synergistic effect of the
Article I and Article II powers which brought it into being, the pre-
121. See supra note 4.
122. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
123. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 n.8 and accompanying text
(1981).
124. BARK, supra note 115, at n.55.
125. Customs and International Trade Bar Association Supplemental Statement
(hereinafter "Customs Bar Statement"). S. Hrg. 100-1018, supra note 11, at 182-183.
126. Id. at 183 (citations omitted).
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sumption is not immune from the charge that it is domestic law rather
than international law which is being reviewed (and reviewed by do-
mestic law standards). Therefore, it can be argued that the Chapter 19
panels are not truly international in character and the situation is dis-
tinguished from Dames & Moore.
Beyond that point, all commentators agree that even assuming a
purely international composition of the system, it is not immune from
constitutional constraints. Two Supreme Court cases considering the
scope of the treaty powers make that stricture clear. In Geofroy v.
Riggs'17 the Supreme Court declared
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms
unlimited except by those restraints which are found in that in-
strument against the action of the government or its depart-
ments, and those arising from the nature of the government it-
self and of that of the states. It would not be contended that it
extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or
a change in the character of the government .... 128
In Reid v. Covert,'29 the Court, relying on the Riggs precedent,
found that an executive agreement between the U.S. and Britain was
an unconstitutional violation of the Sixth Amendment in so far as it
granted U.S. military courts martial jurisdiction over military depen-
dents abroad. The court stated in a plurality decision "no agreement
with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any
other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution ...they cannot be nullified by the Executive or by the
Executive and the Senate combined."' 30 Thus, even an international
procedure to which the United States is a party must abide by the Con-
stitution. The debate over the FTA identified three issues of Constitu-
tional dimension.
2. Appointments Clause
One objection raised in opposition to the panel system was the se-
lection of its members. When a Party challenges an AD/CVD assess-
ment under the FTA, a panel is convened. Each Party selects two
127. Customs Bar Statement, supra note 11, at 167-168 (quoting Geofroy v.
Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, (1890)).
128. Riggs, at 267 (emphasis added).
129. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
130. Id. at 16-17.
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members of a five member panel; the fifth member is chosen by agree-
ment of the Parties, by the four panelists, or by lot. 1 ' The U.S. Trade
Representative is authorized to select panel members for the U.S. after
consulting with Congress.'
The Appointments Clause' 3 requires that senior officers of the
government be appointed by the Executive, with the advice and consent
of the Senate; while inferior officers can be appointed alternatively by
the President, by the Courts, or by agency heads.' Assuming that
panelists would be considered inferior officers, there is no constitutional
impediment to the appointment of the U.S. panelists by the U.S. Trade
Representative. However, the Canadian panelists, if subjected to Ap-
pointments Clause analysis, could not pass Constitutional muster. The
issue then becomes the parameters of the Appointments Clause.
In United States v. Gernaine,"8' the Supreme Court declared that
Officers of the federal government were divided into two classes: senior
officers, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate; and
junior officers who required no confirmation process. "All persons who
can be said to hold an office under the government. . . were intended to
be included within one or the other of these modes of appointment...
"13
That construction of the Appointments Clause was adopted in
Buckley v. Valeo'" where the Supreme Court held the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act unconstitutional in so far as it empowered the Pres-
ident pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House to ap-
point four members of the Federal Election Commission who were
Officers of the United States "exercising significant authority pursuant
to the laws of the United States."' s8
131. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
133. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
134. Id. The Provision states, in part, that the President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Su-
preme Court, and all other Officers of the United States ... but the Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of law, or in the Heads of
Departments.
Id. (emphasis added).
135. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1879).
136. Id. at 509-510.
137. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
138. Id. at 125-126.
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In Morrison v. Olson,'3 the Court held that independent counsel,
appointed by the Special Division under the provisions of the Ethics
and Government Act, was an "inferior" officer of the United States,
whose appointment did not require Senate confirmation.1 40 In so ruling,
the Court noted that "the line between 'inferior' and 'principal' officers
is one that is far from clear." The fact that, inter alia, the office of
independent counsel was 'temporary' in the sense that an independent
counsel is appointed essentially to accomplish a single task, was persua-
sive. " " Similarly, panelists appointed from the roster by the U.S. Trade
Representative serve on one specific review panel and there can be little
doubt that they could qualify as "inferior" officers.14 2
The Canadian appointees remain problematic. Proponents of the
panel review system proposed two solutions. First, they argued that the
panels operated under international legal auspices; therefore panelists
could not be considered Officers of the United States "exercising signif-
icant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States." 4  The
drafters of the FTA sought to avoid the obvious point that the panelists
would be reviewing U.S. AD/CVD law with the provision that, for pur-
poses of panel review, domestic AD/CVD laws "are incorporated into
th[e] Agreement. ' 144 As noted above in the discussion of the presump-
tion of constitutionality, the linchpin of proponents' position on several
constitutional issues rests on the characterization of the FTA, and its
dispute resolution provision, as international law. 14 The second device
proponents used to deflect constitutional challenges premised on the
Appointments Clause was to provide in the Implementation Act that,
in the event Chapter 19 was held unconstitutional on this issue, the
President was authorized to adopt panel decisions as his own." 6 In
spite of these facially corrective measures, the FTA's Chapter 19 and
its progeny in NAFTA remain vulnerable to an Appointment Clause
challenge.
139. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
140. Id. at 670.
141. Id at 671-2.
142. HUSTON, supra note 19, at 543 nn.110-111 and accompanying text.
143. HUSTON, supra note 19, at 543 nn.110-111 and accompanying text.
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
146. HUSTON, supra note 19, at n.102. This provision, dubbed the "fallback mech-
anism," was challenged in Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports v. United States, No. 94-
1627 (D.C. Cir. 1994) and is discussed supra note 250 and accompanying text.
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3. Due Process
The debate over Chapter 19's binational panel review raised two
questions that implicate due process concerns. First, what forum is re-
quired by due process; second, what procedures does it mandate? The
forum question of whether or in what circumstances due process re-
quires judicial review will be taken up in the sub-section below dealing
with Article II issues. The question of what procedures are necessary to
satisfy due process is the focus of this subsection.
In his testimony before the Senate Committee, Professor Bruff
stated that courts have found "in at least some circumstances Congress
is free completely to exclude private parties from participating in tariff
determinations. 1" But he hastened to add that the statement must be
qualified by due process considerations "even where Congress is free to
withhold statutory entitlements to particular government benefits, if it
does confer entitlement, due process requires procedure appropriate to
the context."148 Conceding that whether AD/CVD laws can be deemed
to confer entitlements "is a tricky questions of substantive law,"' 49 Pro-
fessor Bruff assumed that they did for purposes of his analysis. Adopt-
ing Professor Bruff's assumption, the analytical framework has been
provided by case law.
In Mathews v. Eldridge,150 the Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not require that a recipient
of Social Security disability benefits be granted an opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing prior to termination of the benefits. In so doing, the
Court distinguished its earlier decision in Goldberg v. Kelly' 5' where
the Court required a pre-termination hearing for welfare benefits. This
pragmatic and contextual approach to due process analysis 52 is re-
147. See United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary on the Constitutionality of Establishing a Binational Re-
view Panel to Resolve Disputes in Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Cases,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 101, 104 (1988) (Testimony of Prof. Harold M. Bruff stating
"no one has a legal right to the maintenance of an existing rate or duty" (quoting
Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 318 (1933) (Car-
dozo, J.)).
148. Id. at 105, citing Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532
(1985); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
149. Id. The duty is paid to the government, not to the domestic manufacturer;
thus the domestic party receives only an indirect benefit. The issue is whether this
indirect benefit amounts to an entitlement for due process purposes.
150. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
151. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
152. The Court quoted precedent for the proposition that due process " 'is not a
technical conception.'" Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. Mc-
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duced to a three-factor balancing test by the Mathews Court. The test
requires, first, consideration of the private interest affected by official
action; second, "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures" and the ameliorating value of "additional pro-
cedural safeguards;" and third, the nature and importance of the Gov-
ernment's interest and the impact additional safeguards might have on
that interest. 153 The "fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.' "154 This requirement is given definition by the nexus between
the relative importance of the private interest and the government in-
terest and the safeguards of the procedure provided. In Schweiker v.
McClure,55 the Court gave additional definition to the procedural re-
quirements by emphasizing the importance of the expertise and qualifi-
cation of the decision-makers.
Applying the Mathews and Schweiker template to Chapter 19,
most commentators have found, as did Professor Bruff, that the proce-
dural safeguards provided by it are sufficient for due process purposes:
the interests of private litigants in accurate assessments and the gov-
ernment's interest in effecting a free trade zone with Canada as a part
of its trade policy are adequately protected by the process provided in
Articles 1901-1911 of the FTA. 151
Assuming that the procedures are constitutionally firm, is the fo-
rum adequate for due process purposes? Under certain circumstances,
courts have held that due process rights are not adequately protected
unless an Article III court makes the ultimate decision in the case.1 57
Elroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)). It "'is flexible and calls for such procedural protec-
tions as the particular demands.' " Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972)). And "whether the administrative procedures provided ... are consti-
tutionally sufficent requires analysis of the governmental and private interests that are
affected." Id. at 334 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167-168 (1974) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring in part)).
153. Id. at 335.
154. Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). See
also Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985)
("due process is a flexible concept").
155. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
156. BRUFF, supra note 147, at 107-111.
157. See, e.g., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (use of a magis-
trate to hear live testimony and submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
in criminal matter did not violate due process since Article III judge was the ultimate
decision-maker); Crowell v. Crowell, 285 U.S. 22 (1931) (delegating authority to dep-
uty commissioner of United States Employees' Compensation Commission to hear com-
pensation claims does not violate due process since commissioner's judgment may be
appealed to a federal district court).
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4. Article III Concerns
Article III provides that "the judicial power of the United States
shall be vested in one [S]upreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.' " While it
is clear that Congress has broad power to determine the jurisdictional
reach of the federal judiciary, it is equally clear that this power is not
unlimited. The apparently intractable problem is to craft an adequate
test for delineating the extent of this type of legislative power. Three
cases are considered pre-eminent guides through this murky area of
law.
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Co.,"8 9 the Supreme Court struck down a provision in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act which authorized bankruptcy judges to hear all civil pro-
ceedings related to bankruptcy litigation. These proceedings would in-
clude not only claims brought under federal law, but also traditional
state law claims including, for example, claims alleging fraudulent con-
veyances or to recover accounts. A plurality found the delegation vio-
lated Article III since bankruptcy judges to do not enjoy Article III
status but the issues they would hear under this act were entitled to
Article III adjudication. 6 0 In his dissent, Justice White suggested that
"the plurality opinion is not the first unsuccessful attempt to articulate
a principled ground by which to distinguish Article I [legislative
courts] from Article III courts."'' Nevertheless, the plurality opinion
can be said to stand for the following propositions: (1) Article III
judges are protected by life tenure and non-reducible salary provisions
in order to insure their independence from political forces emanating
from the other two branches; 162 (2) bankruptcy judges are not Article
III judges and do not enjoy such protection; and (3) the Bankruptcy
Reform Act impermissably delegates essential attributes of judicial
power to bankruptcy judges by permitting them to hear and determine
a broad array of civil claims.' 63
Only three narrow exceptions have been carved from the general
rule that the judicial power of the federal government is vested in Arti-
cle III courts. 64 In each of these exceptions, the Article I courts have
158. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
159. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982).
160. Id. at 81, 86.
161. Id. at 105.
162. Id. at 58.
163. Id. at 60.
164. Id. at 64.
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been considered "consistent with, rather than threatening to, the consti-
tutional mandate of separation of powers."16' The exceptions include
"non-Article III territorial courts,"166 which have jurisdiction in areas
which do not have a state government (e.g. the District of Columbia)
and Congress has plenary powers. Second, military court-martial courts
have been historically accepted as Article I courts.' Finally, Article I
courts may adjudicate "public rights" issues.
The concept of "public rights" was first introduced in Murray's
Lessee"8 and remains somewhat amorphous. In Murray's Lessee, sum-
mary proceedings by Article I courts to enforce a debt owed to the
federal government by customs agents were deemed permissible be-
cause they involved issues of "public rights,"'169 but the Court did not
define the term. Similarly, the plurality in Northern Pipeline refrained
from attempting to define "public rights," but it declared that, at a
minimum, it must involve a dispute between the federal government
and others.1 70 The opinion added that the presence of the federal gov-
ernment as a litigant was a necessary but not sufficient characteristic of
"public rights."1 7' It found that the matters at issue in Northern Pipe-
line did not fall within the category of "public rights" issues. In so
holding, the Court rejected the argument that because a discharge in
bankruptcy is a right conferred by federal statute, it is a "public right"
amenable to Article I adjudication. Therefore, the case presented no
violation of Article III. The Court agreed that bankruptcy discharge
was indeed a "public right" similar to other rights created by Congress,
such as licenses and entitlements. However, it found that the proceed-
ings in bankruptcy with which the Article I judges would be concerned
165. Id. The plurality recognizes the case of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856) as seminal on this issue. In Murray's Lessee, the
court said "we do not consider Congress can either withdraw from judicial cognizance
any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in
equity, or admiralty." Id. at 284.
166. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 64. This exception was recognized in Pal-
more v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397 (1973) (Art. I courts have jurisdiction in the
District of Columbia).
167. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 66.
168. See, supra, note 164.
[T]here are matters, involving public rights which may be presented in such
form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are
susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not
bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may
deem proper. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 284.
169. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 284.
170. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70.
171. Id.
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essentially involved traditional private law issues. 172 The plurality was
not persuaded by the argument that bankruptcy is such a specialized
area of the law that it requires particular expertise which Article I
courts might provide. 173
Applying the reasoning of the plurality in Northern Pipeline to
Chapter 19 review panels, the pivotal issue is whether AD/CVD deter-
minations involve "public rights" or "private rights." Clearly, the fed-
eral government is a party to the proceedings. And it could be argued
that AD/CVD issues are arguably distinguishable from the kinds of
cases listed in Northern Pipeline which involve traditional state law ad-
judication between private parties while disputes in AD/CVD cases
arise from a "public right." On the other hand, since 1956,17 the
United States has treated AD/CVD issues as Article III issues by con-
ferring Article III status on the CIT. It could thus be argued that, as a
matter of precedent and practice, AD/CVD dispute resolution has been
considered an exercise of judicial power entitled to judicial review. 17 5
The second case in the Article III trilogy is Thomas v. Union Car-
bide Agricultural Products Co., 176 where the Court upheld a provision
in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
mandating arbitration to determine the compensation owed one manu-
facturer by another for the use of data disclosed as a part of the regis-
tration process. The Court found that where, as in that situation, regis-
tration was voluntary, the parties consented to arbitration. Further,
limited judicial review of arbitration decisions was available under the
legislative scheme; therefore, Article III was not violated. 177 Finally,
the legislative scheme at issue arguably confers "public rights." Apply-
ing the Thomas analysis to Chapter 19 also yields ambivalent results.
While Thomas lends support for the concept that Article I arbitration
is an acceptable practical approach to dispute resolution arising out of
government programs, the situation in Thomas is distinguishable from
the panel review setting in two respects: importers cannot be said to
172. Id. at 72.
173. Id.
174. In 1956 the U.S. Customs Court was designated an Article III court.
175. See supra note 125, at 170-171. The Customs and International Trade Bar
argued that Congress evinced a clear recognition of AD/CVD issues as Article III
issues in the legislative history of the Act of July 14, 1956 (Congressional Committee
report stating "Customs Court handles cases which very properly come within the judi-
cial power of the United States as set forth in Article III... ). The Bar statement adds
that this approach was given Supreme Court imprimatur in Gliddon Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530 (1962).
176. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
177. Id. at 589-93.
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submit to panel review voluntarily as a result of their trading activity;
and, unlike FIFRA, the FTA does not provide for even limited judicial
review of panel determinations.1 78
The third case in the relevant trilogy is Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission v. Schor,17 9 in which the Court upheld the authority of
the Commission to adjudicate state common law counterclaims. In
Schor, the Court applied a test for weighing the nature of the rights
that are at issue against the Congressional purpose in establishing an
Article I tribunal and the extent to which "essential attributes of judi-
cial power" were jeopardized or implicated by the scheme.' 80 Again,
applying Schor to Chapter 19 leads to no clear resolution. Since it is
unclear whether the rights at issue are "public" or "private," the first
element of the test as applied to Chapter 19 remains indeterminate.
The panel review regime was the compromise provision made to reach
accord on the FTA;' 8 ' therefore the governmental interest in establish-
ing an Article I tribunal is strong. The second element argues in favor
of the provision's constitutionality. Regarding the third factor, Profes-
sor Bruff stated that while the provision would be clearly unconstitu-
tional in the domestic setting, its international character trumps other
considerations under the Schor test. 8 2 Again, this argument in favor of
the provision's constitutionality relies heavily on the characterization
conferred on the AD/CVD laws which are expressly incorporated into
it. But the Northern Pipeline - Thomas - Schor trilogy does not resolve
the issue of whether Chapter 19 escapes an Article III challenge either
because it concerns only public rights or because it concerns interna-
tional rather than domestic law. In summary, the binational panel re-
view scheme is vulnerable to an Article III challenge but the outcome
is shrouded in the ambivalence of doctrine.
5. Complete Preclusion of Judicial Review: Constitutional Issues
A much less daunting task is presented by the issue in extreme: at
what point or under what circumstances, if any, is judicial review of
panel decisions mandated by the Constitution? During the debate on
the FTA, witnesses who spoke to the issue uniformly counseled against
complete preclusion of judicial review.' 83 Courts do not favor preclusion
178. BRUFF, supra note 147, at 113-114.
179. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
180. Id. at 852.
181. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
182. See BRUFF, supra note 147, at 115.
183. See, e.g., BRUFF supra note 147, at 111.
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and will not find it by implication. 8 Indeed, even when faced with a
statute that appears to preclude judicial review expressly, the Supreme
Court has construed the "no-review clause" to permit judicial review of
constitutional issues raised pursuant to it. So, for example, in Johnson
v. Robison 8" a conscientious objector challenged the constitutionality
of the Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act ("Act") on the grounds
that it conferred educational benefits in a manner that violated the
First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 86 The Court interpreted the
"no-review clause"18 of the Act to permit constitutional challenges to
the Act on the dual grounds that a "constitutional challenge is not to
any . . . decision of the Administrator, [such challenge being expressly
barred by the "no-review" clause] but rather to a decision of Congress"
[in this case, the educational benefit scheme of the Act] ;188 and the
principle that " '[a]judication of the constitutionality of congressional
enactments has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of ad-
ministrative agencies."" 89 To read the "no-review clause" as a bar to
review of constitutional challenges would "raise serious questions con-
cerning the constitutionality" of the no-review provision.' 9
Similarly, in Webster v. Doe,' the Supreme Court interpreted a
provision of the National Security Act which gave discretionary power
to an agency head as not precluding judicial review of a constitutional
challenge. 92 The Court opined "[w]e do not think § 102(c) may be
184. See, e.g., United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201 (1982) (Court of Claims
had no power to hear determination relating to benefits under Medicare); Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 827 (1985) (Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-
706, established a general statutory right to judicial review in the absence of statute
specifically precluding it); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 190 (1958) ("This Court
cannot lightly infer that Congress does not intend judicial protection of rights it confers
against agency action .... ").
185. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
186. Id. at 364.
187. The "no-review clause," section 211(a) of the Act, states in part "the deci-
sions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered
by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits for veterans . . . shall be final and
conclusive and no . . . court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to
review any such decision." Id. at 367.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 368 (quoting Public Utils. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534,
539 (1958)).
190. Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. at 366. It should be noted that the rights at
issue in Johnson were "public" in nature.
191. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
192. Section 102(c) of the Act provides in part "the Director of Central Intelli-
gence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of
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read to exclude review of constitutional claims." 19 In the face of the
relative clarity of precedent on this issue, the drafters of the FTA took
the better part of valor and included a provision for judicial review of
constitutional issues raised by the Agreement. 194
6. Separation of Powers
Closely related to Article III and preclusion issues is the doctrine
of separation of powers, although the focus of the former is the consti-
tutional rights of private parties while the subject of the latter is the
relative powers of the three governmental branches under the Constitu-
tion. Several arguments have been advanced in support of the proposi-
tion that Chapter 19's binational panel review scheme does not violate
the doctrine. An essential component of these views includes the char-
acterization of the panel system as "international." Again, no analysis
has conclusively shown the system to be international and, therefore,
clearly within the jurisdictional reach of the executive and legislative
branches.1 95 The membership of panels and ECCs is binational but the
nature of the law panelists and committee members review, and the
standard of review to be applied by them, are clearly domestic. Fur-
thermore, in the United States, domestic AD/CVD law has a venerable
history of being considered reviewable by the judiciary.19 6
the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the
interests of the United States." Id. at 594 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 403(c)). The Court
crafted the issue this way: "whether, and to what extent, the termination decisions of
the Director under § 102(c) are judicially reviewable." Id.
193. Id. at 603.
194. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-449, § 401(c), 102 Stat. 1851, 1879 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(g)(4)(B)).
195. . For example, Professor Bruff's analysis rests heavily on what he believes to
be the international character of FTA adjudication:
Indeed, what is essential in crafting international agreements is the power to
make arbitral bodies truly international in composition. Hence, they are crea-
tures of the foreign policy powers to be found in Articles I and II . ..
[a]ttempts by Congress to aggrandize itself at the expense of [another
branch] . . .present fundamentally different problems from attempts to au-
thorize or require the delegation outside the government of some functions
that could be performed by the executive.
BRUFF, supra note 147, at 116-7.
196. See Customs Bar Statement, supra note 125, at 169-72:
Given the historical fact of customs duty suits in law or equity in England
and pre-constitutional United States, the clear expression of Congress in its
1956 recognition of the CIT's predecessor as an Article III court and the
holdings of the majority of the Supreme Court on the constitutional require-
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Other arguments advanced in support of the notion that the FTA
poses no separation of powers problem are less persuasive. One view
holds that there can be no real insult to the tripartite balance where, as
a practical matter, the number of cases to be heard by the panels (in
relation to the number of cases which will continue to be heard by the
CIT) is small.197 As discussed above, the strength of that agreement
diminishes in inverse proportion to the increasing number of free trade
accords to which the United States is bound. Finally, the argument has
been advanced that the Court employs the Separation of Powers doc-
trine to eviscerate Congressional attempts to encroach upon powers
properly assigned to the Executive, not the Judicial Branch. 198 While
historically this has most often been the case, a notable exception oc-
curred in 1995. In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 99 the Supreme Court
found a Congressional enactment to be an unconstitutional encroach-
ment on the powers of the Judicial Branch in contravention of Separa-
tion of Powers precepts. The view that constitutional challenges pre-
mised upon the doctrine traditionally involve legislative
aggrandizement at the expense of the Executive, not the Judiciary, pre-
dates Plaut. The Supreme Court has most recently proved itself per-
fectly capable of defending its own constitutional turf under Separation
of Powers analysis.
The Doctrine of Separation of Powers is, of course, considered to
be a fundamental tenet of American constitutional government. The
headwaters from which the Doctrine flow are found not only in the U.S
Constitution but also in the Federalist Papers.2 00 The doctrine avoids
an arid purism and permits flexibility in protecting the integrity of each
ment for Article III court review, there can be no doubt that the binational
panel ... a non-judicial, non-United States body violates the tri-partiate [sic]
nature of our Governmental system and denies to the importer citizen the
protection afforded by an impartial and independent judiciary.
Id. at 171-72.
197. A related argument is that the panel system was designed as a temporary
measure of seven years' duration to give the parties time to develop a harmonized body
of AD/CVD law. See Bark, supra note 115, at n. 113-14 and accompanying text. That
argument has not stood the test of time; as the seven-year deadline approaches there
appears to be no impetus for devising a unified system and, as discussed above,
NAFTA institutes the panel system with no deadline for enacting a harmonized body
of law to replace it.
198. See Huston, supra note 19, at 543 n.116.
199. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 115 S.Ct. 1446 (1995).
200. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989); Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-96 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725 (1986);
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 442 (1977); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 119 (1976).
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Branch of the government while allowing a pragmatic overlap of pow-
ers in order to maintain "a nation capable of governing itself effec-
tively.12 0 1 But the Court has identified two markers by which to distin-
guish impermissible encroachments upon Judicial power from realistic
interdependence of the branches:
first, that the Judicial Branch neither be assigned nor allowed
"tasks that are more properly accomplished by [other] branches
... and, second, that no provision of law 'impermissibly threat-
ens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.' "202
The balance between the independence of the judiciary and the
effectiveness of government is struck at the fulcrum of that Branch's
"institutional integrity." Absent the three narrow exceptions identified
above - territorial courts, court martials, and courts considering "public
rights" issues - judicial functions vest solely in the Third Branch.
The importance of preserving the integrity of the judiciary has
been said to rest in its independence from political pressure. That inde-
pendence is assured in large part by the two Article III provisions of
life tenure and undiminished salary. It was Alexander Hamilton's ob-
servation that
[S]o long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the
legislative and the executive . . . liberty can have nothing to
fear from the Judiciary alone, but would have everything to
fear from its union with either of the other departments ...
[and] permanency in office . .. may therefore be justly re-
garded as an indispensable ingredient .... [to maintaining the
independence of] permanency in office, nothing can contribute
more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision
for their support .... In the general course of human nature, a
power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his
will .... [Article III also] has provided that the judges of the
United States shall ... receive for the services ... a compensa-
tion, which "shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office." 2 0 3
201. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121.
202. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 383 (quoting Morrison; Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
203. The Federalist Nos. 78, 79, at 466, 472-73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). The Compensation Clause of Article III was most recently em-
ployed to invalidate statutes which reduced cost-of-living salary increases to federal
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Thus, a discussion of the separation of powers implications of the
FTA binational panel review regime would seem incomplete without a
recognition of a principal reason for maintaining the integrity of the
judicial function under the tripartite system of the Constitution: the
judiciary is afforded some measure of freedom from the corrupting in-
fluence of political pressure to which the other two branches are vulner-
able by the tenure and salary provisions of Article III. The importance
those provisions might have in evaluating Chapter 19 emerges in the
protracted and highly disputed AD/CVD case involving imports of
softwood lumber from Canada to the United States.
III. THE SOFTWOOD LUMBER DISPUTE - A CAUTIONARY TALE
A. Introduction
While binational panels have now had the opportunity to review a
number of AD/CVD assessment cases under the auspices of the FTA,
the Softwood Lumber dispute seems an apt illustration of how the
panel system operates. It serves to illuminate the panel system's effec-
tiveness as a replacement for judicial review for a variety of reasons.
First, the dispute, or lack thereof, spans a decade; it pre-dates the
FTA.20' Second, the Softwood Lumber dispute has made full use of the
adjudicative procedures provided by the FTA for challenges to AD/
CVD assessments: from panel review through ECC review to a consti-
tutional challenge. Following ratification of the FTA, Canadian com-
plainants requested binational panel review of AD/CVD assessments
made by the U.S. Department of Commerce.20 5 The issue came before
the panel three times and on two occasions the case was remanded to
Commerce. 06 The United States government sought review of the lat-
est panel decision convening an ECC pursuant to section 1904.13 and
Annex 1904.13 FTA.2°1 Following a decision by the Committee dis-
missing the request for extraordinary challenge and affirming the deci-
sion and order of the review panel, a U.S. trade association filed suit in
judges. See also United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
204. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159
(1983) (Lumber I). "Softwood Lumber" is defined as certain type of coniferous wood
under subheadings 4407.10.00 - 4409.10.90 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States.
205. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 58 Fed. Reg. 44,653
(1993) (Panel Review I).
206. See infra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
207. In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada ECC -
94-1904-01-USA, 1994 WL 405928 (NAFTA Binat. Panel Aug. 3, 1994).
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the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, challenging the constitutional-
ity of Chapter 19 of the FTA and its implementing legislation.208 Thus,
the case lends perspective to the entire adjudicatory process crafted by
the FTA. Third, what emerges from the case as it moves through the
process is the very real problem of maintaining the panel system's ap-
pearance of legitimacy and integrity upon which its very success as a
bilateral dispute resolution mechanism will rest. Absent the kinds of
protection granted to Article III courts which serve to maintain the
perception and the reality of their independence from political influ-
ence, decisions rendered by binational panels under extant and future
free trade accords will be vulnerable to charges of self-interest and po-
litical pressure.
B. Lumber I through Lumber III and Beyond.
1. Lumber I
The first in a series of Softwood Lumber cases, which culminated
in the 1995 constitutional challenge to Chapter 19, was initiated in
1982 by a petition from a U.S trade association20 9 asking the Depart-
ment of Commerce to assess a countervailing duty against softwood
imports from Canada.21 0 The Coalition alleged that fees collected from
private parties under "stumpage programs"21 amounted to an imper-
missible subsidy because the rates were "artificially low." Commerce
declined to assess a duty in Lumber I finding no subsidy existed under
U.S. law. That decision rested on three grounds: 1) the stumpage pro-
gram did not confer rights on a "specific enterprise or industry, or
group of enterprises or industries" as required by 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(5)(B)(ii); 2) nor were the rights conferred "specific" as re-
quired by Commerce's specificity test; and 3) the stumpage rights were
not conferred at "preferential" rates as defined by the Tariff Act of
1930.12
208. Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports v. United States, No. 94-1627 (D.C. Cir.,
1994). The case was dismissed and settled out of court. See infra note 250 and accom-
panying text.
209. U.S. Coalition for Fair Canadian Lumber Imports (Coalition).
210. Lumber I, supra note 204.
211. Most public forests in Canada (Crown forests) are owned and administered
by provincial governments. "Stumpage programs" permit private parties to harvest
timber from Crown forests for a fee. See Panel Review I, supra note 205.
212. Lumber I, supra note 204, at 24,167. Commerce found that the private par-
ties participating in the programs totaled 27 companies representing three groups of
industries. See supra note 207.
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2. Lumber II
A new Coalition initiated a second challenge to the stumpage pro-
gram in 1986.218 The new petition asserted that evidence of preferential
treatment had surfaced and that the law had materially changed since
Lumber J.214 Commerce reversed its earlier finding and, in its prelimi-
nary determination,2 15 concluded that the stumpage programs
amounted to a subsidy of the Softwood Lumber products exported to
the U.S. by Canadian producers. In Lumber II, Commerce found the
programs to be specific and preferential. 16
3. Memorandum of Understanding
The preliminary determination in Lumber II was followed by a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) executed by the United
States and Canada on December 30, 1986. Under its terms the Coali-
tion withdrew its petition and Commerce terminated its investigations,
nullifying its preliminary determination in exchange for Canada's
agreement to assess a 15 % charge on Softwood Lumber exports to the
U.S.2"7 In 1991, Canada studied the stumpage programs in the timber-
producing provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and Que-
bec. The study found that the stumpage programs produced a net reve-
nue over production costs to the provinces, and Canada concluded that
evidence of subsidy could no longer be found and served notice on the
United States that it would exercise its right to terminate the MOU.
Accordingly, the MOU was terminated on October 4, 1991.
4. Lumber III
On October 31, 1991, shortly after the effective termination date
213. 51 FED. REG. 37,453 (1986) (Lumber II).
214. Softwood Lumber from Canada, 16 ITRD 1170, 1171 (1993) (citing 51
Fed. Reg. 21,205, 21,207 (1986)).
215. Id. at 1171 (citing 51 FED. REG. 37,453 (1986)).
216. Id. (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453, 37,456-57 (1986)). In making the determi-
nation of preferentiality, Commerce utilized the Crown's cost of producing the timber
as the measure of preference. Finding a differential between the cost of production and
the stumpage fees, Commerce concluded that there was a benefit flowing from the
stumpage programs amounting to 14.5% ad valorem. See 16 ITRD 1171 (citing 51
FED. REG. 37,453, 37,458).
217. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 52 Fed. Reg. 315,
amended, Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 52 FED. REG. 2,751
(1987). The 1987 Amendment to the MOU eliminated the charge against one province
and exempted three other provinces.
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of the MOU, Commerce self-initiated a countervailing duty investiga-
tion against Canadian imports of Softwood Lumber 218 on the basis that
Canada's withdrawal from the MOU (the effective cause of the termi-
nation of Commerce's investigation and preliminary determination)
served to reactivate the 1986 investigation. 219 As a part of the self-
initiated investigation into the stumpage programs, Commerce also in-
vited submission of evidence that Canadian federal and provincial log
export regulations constituted countervailable subsidies.22 0 The self-ini-
tiation and the additional log export issue were vigorously challenged
by Canadian interests. 2 ' However, on March 5, 1992, Commerce is-
sued a preliminary finding that not only did the stumpage programs in
Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec confer a countervail-
able subsidy in the average amount of 6.25 %, but also the log export
restrictions in British Columbia conferred an average subsidy of
8.23% .222 In the Final Determination, Commerce found an average
subsidy of 2.91 % was produced by the "stumpage programs"223 and a
subsidy of 4.65% was conferred by British Columbia's log export
regulations.
5. Panel Review I
The Canadian federal government and several provincial govern-
ments then petitioned for Chapter 19 panel review of Commerce's
Lumber III final determination.224 Canadian parties challenged both
grounds underlying Commerce's Final Determination of the stumpage
program issue: specificity and preferentiality. 2 As to the specificity is-
sue, the Panel found that Commerce was required to consider all rele-
vant evidence relating to the four factors enunciated in the agency's
Proposed Regulations .2 2  The panel also concluded that Commerce
218. See 56 FED. REG. 56,055 (1991).
219. Article 2.1 of The GATT Subsidies Code (Agreement on Interpretation and
Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII on the General Agreement on Tariff and
Trade) requires "special circumstances" to justify a "self-initiated" investigation. See
16 ITRD 1172 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 56,055, 56,056-57 (1991)).
220. 56 FED. REG. 56,055, 56,057.
221. See 16 ITRD 1173 (citing correspondence of Robert C. Cassidy, Jr., to the
Honorable Robert A. Mosbacher, Sr.).
222. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 57 FED. REG. 8,800,
8,810, 8,816 (1992).
223. Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 14 ITRD 2166 (1992)
(citing 57 FED. REG. 22,570, 22,604).
224. Softwood Lumber from Canada, 16 ITRD 1170 (1993).
225. Id. at 1181.
226. The four factors are: (1) extent to which government acts to limit the pro-
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could not base its determination only on one factor (the number of par-
ticipant industries in the stumpage programs). Commerce must also
consider the "inherent characteristics" of the natural resources in as-
sessing the importance of a small number of industry participants, es-
pecially if the government did nothing to limit the number of actual
users. Additionally, the Panel felt Commerce should document the evi-
dentiary basis for its findings on the factors considered.22 7 Accordingly,
the Panel remanded the case to Commerce for additional evaluation.228
On the preferentiality issue, the Panel remanded to Commerce for con-
sideration of whether the provincial stumpage programs distorted the
competitive markets.22 9 The Panel remanded the specificity issue' 80 for
a clarification of the agency's interpretation of the legal standard for a
finding of subsidy and a showing that Commerce's determination met
the standard by substantial evidence on the record.2"1 The remand Or-
der also called for certain recalculations.232
6. Panel Review II and III
On remand, Commerce analyzed the specificity issue under the
four factors identified in the Proposed Regulations and essentially reit-
erated the previous holdings articulated in its Final Determination. In
Panel Review II a majority of the Panel found that Commerce's hold-
ing was unsupported by substantial evidence on the record and other-
wise not in accordance with the law. Commerce had failed to establish
that either the stumpage program or the log export restrictions resulted
in a market distortion. On remand, Commerce reaffirmed its previous
decision but in accordance with the Panel's instructions, it found no
countervailable subsidies. That ruling was affirmed by the Panel on
February 23, 1994 (Panel Review III).23 As a result, the U.S. Govern-
ment petitioned for an extraordinary challenge.
gram; (2) the number of businesses or groups that actually use a program; (3) whether
dominant users or whether certain groups receive the most benefits; and (4) extent to
which government exercises discretion in choosing who receives benefits under the pro-
gram. Id. at 1184.
227. Id. at 1184-89.
228. Id. at 1189.
229. Id. at 1197.
230. Softwood Lumber from Canada, 16 ITRD 1170, 1203 (1993).
231. Id. at 1221.
232. Id. The court directed Commerce to recalculate the factors it considered in
finding that the Canadian subsidies resulted in market distortion. Id.
233. Id. at 1236.
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7. Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC)23 '
The ECC, convened pursuant to U.S. petition, was comprised of
two Canadians and one American. The Committee decision split on na-
tional lines, as had the Panel Review III decision which preceded it. A
majority of the ECC affirmed the panel opinion.2 85 The United States
had charged the Panel with exceeding its authority by failing to apply
the appropriate standard of review and by substituting its own judg-
ment for that of the agency. The U.S. contended that these errors ma-
terially affected the panel's decision and threatened the integrity of the
panel review process. 2 6 The United States also alleged that there was a
material breach of the rules of conduct identified in Article 1910 of the
FTA on the part of both Canadian panelists and "serious conflict of
interest" on the part of one Canadian panelist.23 7 Annex 1901.2 of the
FTA requires, inter alia, that panelists should not take instructions
from or be affiliated with, or considered to be affiliated with, either
country.2 38 The Code of Conduct mandates ongoing disclosure of all
interests or relationships of a panelist that might "affect the ... [panel-
ist's] independence and impartiality or that might reasonably create
the appearance of bias."'23 9 A majority of the Committee (which is to
say, two of the three members) found that "no allegation was raised
against ... [the two panelists by the U.S.] ... until after the panel had
twice decided the issue against the position of the United States al-
though there was ample opportunity to do So. ''240 The charges included
alleged conflicts of interest and alleged failures to disclose conflicts of
interests by the two panelists and the law firms with which they were
associated. Justice Hart concluded that because panelists are required
234. For an overview of Section 1904.13 delineating the contours of extraordinary
challenges, see supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. This was only the third time
the ECC provision had been used. In 1991 the U.S. requested an ECC in a CVD case
involving pork imports from Canada. Extraordinary Challenge Committee Upholds
Panel in Pork Case, Duties will be Imposed, 8 ITRD 933 (1991). In 1993 the U.S.
filed an ECC challenge in a CVD live-swine case involving Canada. Extraordinary
Challenge filed by U.S. in Countervailing Duty Swine Dispute, 10 ITR 181 (1993).
235. Supra note 208, at 10.
236. Id. See also notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
237. Article 1904(13) includes, as a ground for an extraordinary challenge "(a)(i)
a member of the panel was guilty of ... a serious conflict of interest, or otherwise
materially violated the rules of conduct .... and ... (b) any of the actions set out in
subparagraph (a) has materially affected the panel's decision and threatened the integ-
rity of the binational panel review process . . " FTA, supra note 4.
238. FTA, supra note 4.
239. FTA, supra note 4, at Article 1910.
240. Supra note 208, at 24 (opinion of Justice Gordon L.S. Hart).
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to be conversant with the highly technical nature of the cases it is inev-
itable that they, and perhaps other members of their law firms, will
practice in the field of international trade law either in the private sec-
tor, in a governmental capacity, or both. He felt that the two panelists
had made "reasonable efforts to make sure that there was no work be-
ing conducted by their firms that would in any way interfere with their
impartiality in the matter before the panel ... [and] there was no inten-
tional refusal to reveal any matter that would justify the opposite party
in removing either panelist." 24' The Honorable Herbert B. Morgan
agreed, adding that while both panelists were somewhat remiss in fail-
ing to comply strictly with the disclosure code, the disclosures that had
been made were entirely consistent with undisclosed information.
Therefore, he found no breach of either Article 1904.12(a)(I) or
(a)(II).
The dissent of the Honorable Malcolm Wilkey (retired United
States Circuit Judge) took issue with the majority's findings and con-
clusions. He first addressed the appropriate standard of review for
Chapter 19 panels and ECCs and, in so doing, relied heavily upon the
legislative history of the FTA and of NAFTA. He concluded that the
majority failed to observe the statutory mandate to replicate the work
of U.S. appellate courts reviewing agency action, to act as a substitute
adjudicatory body that would apply U.S. law in a manner consistent
with U.S. appellate courts. 4
If this substitute appellate system had not been intended to
achieve similar results in applying U.S. law, the United States
would never have agreed to it. The United States never contem-
plated that United States law would be changed by a binational
body. If the substitute appellate system does not achieve similar
results in applying U.S. law, it may not be long continued.24
Specifically, Judge Wilkey in his dissent charged that a majority of the
Panel directed Commerce to make a certain determination and to ap-
241. Id. at 28. The charges concerned alleged failures to disclose representation of
the Canadian federal and provincial governments and certain Canadian lumber compa-
nies by the law firms of the two panelists on matters unrelated to the Softwood Lumber
case at issue. One panelist was also charged with a serious conflict of interest because a
company, of which he was president, was under contract with the Canadian govern-
ment to present a seminar on Canadian merger law applicable to the airline industry.
Id. at 39-40 (opinion of Judge Morgan).
242. Id. at 50 (Wilkey, J. dissenting).
243. Id.
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ply a certain methodology in contravention of the proper role assigned
to appellate review of agency action. That role, said Judge Wilkey, was
aptly characterized in Daewoo Electronics v. International Union.
On review of the issue, like the trial court [CIT], we look to see
whether substantial evidence supports the decision of the ITA
on this issue . . . . The question is whether the record ade-
quately supports the decision of the ITA, not whether some
other opinion could reasonably have been drawn. As frequently
stated, "the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's
finding from being supported by substantial evidence."244
According to Judge Wilkey, both the Panel and the Committee
failed to observe the standard: the Panel by disaffirming Commerce's
finding and methodology; the Committee by failing to disaffirm the
Panel opinion. Judge Wilkey opined that the Committee's action vio-
lated its mandate (implicit in the FTA but made explicit in NAFTA)
that a panel which failed to observe the appropriate standard of review
had, per se, manifestly exceeded its powers.24 5 It is notable that Judge
Wilkey attributes the majority's error to the fact that
they are experts in trade law; they are not experts in the field of
judicial review of agency action . .. [therefore] we are likely to
continue to get a usurpation of the administrative agency func-
tions by well intentioned experts in the field of trade law . . .
[and] there are only three ways to become an expert in the
matter of judicial review of administrative agency action ... to
spend some years either arguing cases before a reviewing court,
teaching courses in administrative law, or sitting on one of
those reviewing courts itself.2 46
Pointedly, Judge Wilkey concluded "[w]e always lose something
244. Daewoo Electronics v. Int'l Union, 6 F.3d 1511, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (cita-
tions omitted). Daewoo was a countervailing duty case in which the Federal Circuit,
the judicial counterpart of the ECC, overruled the directive of the CIT (the Panel's
judicial counterpart) to employ a certain methodology to determine the tax incidence of
commodity taxes upon consumers in the Korean market.
245. Supra note 208, at 67-71. See also supra notes 90-91 and accompanying
text. NAFTA also requires an ECC to examine the panel's legal and factual analysis
underlying the decision. Id.
246. Supra note 207, at 74.
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by resorting to ad hoc Tribunals. ' 247 Certainly the Softwood Lumber
case is evidence of the truth of that statement. Both the charge that the
panelists or Committee members lack at least the perception of exper-
tise in the judicial review process, and the charge that panelists were
compromised by bias or self-interest, served seriously to weaken the
effectiveness of the dispute resolution mechanism of the FTA, or
NAFTA, and any of the progeny that adopt it.
As to the latter charge, Judge Wilkey opined that because disclo-
sure is the keystone for the panel selection process, affording each
Party the right to reject any panelist on the basis of that disclosure,
failure to disclose is fatal to the decision of any panel comprised of
non-disclosing panelists. On that basis, Judge Wilkey concluded that
the opinion and judgment of the Softwood Lumber panel should have
been set aside. 4 8
The vehemence with which opposing positions were held in the
case was evidenced by the filing of a constitutional challenge in the
D.C. appellate court following the Committee's affirming the Panel's
decision and the dismissal of the U.S. Trade Representative's ex-
traordinary challenge to that decision.249
8. Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports v. United States
(Coalition Case)
The Coalition Case requested declaratory and injunctive relief
pursuant to Section 401(c) of the U.S. - Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment Implementation Act of 1988250 on the grounds that it was uncon-
247. Id. at 76.
248. Judge Wilkey concluded
I cannot think of anything that could more materially affect a Panel's deci-
sion then [sic] to have two of the necessary votes cast by members who have
failed to disclose matters which would affect their impartiality. Likewise, to
tolerate such failure to disclose would constitute the most obvious and danger-
ous threat to the integrity of the Binational Panel review process ....
Id.
249. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
250. Pub. L. No. 100-449, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1851, 1879 (codified
at 19 U.S.C. § 1516 a (g)(4)(A)) which provides in part:
(A) . . . An Action for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief, or both,
regarding a determination on the grounds that any provision of, or amend-
ment made by, the U.S. - Canada Free-Trade Implementation Agreement
Act [sic] of 1988 implementing the binational dispute settlement system
under Chapter 19 . . . violates the Constitution may be brought in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Circuit's
decision is subject to expedited appeal to the Supreme Court. 19 U.S.C.
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stitutional on its face and as applied, in a number of respects.
The Coalition alleged that it had been denied Fifth Amendment
due process in the Softwood Lumber case. It alleged that Chapter 19's
dispute resolution procedure, and the fallback mechanism25 1 permitting
the President to adopt panel decisions, violated the Appointments
Clause of Article II § 2, cl. 2, the due process and equal protection
requirements of the Fifth Amendment, and the Doctrine of Separation
of Powers implied by Articles I, II, and III. The Coalition's petition
was filed on September 14, 1994. On December 15, 1994, the Coalition
announced that it was requesting dismissal of its lawsuit. On the same
day the U.S. Trade Representative announced an agreement with Can-
ada to establish a bilateral consultative body on trade in Softwood
Lumber to resolve the ongoing dispute. Simultaneously, the Depart-
ment of Commerce announced plans to refund the cash deposits with
interest held by Commerce under the countervailing duty order issued
by Commerce in 1992.252 The softwood dispute is not yet resolved in a
political sense, although its legal component is now apparently com-
plete. However, it leaves behind a legacy which casts doubt on the
strength and legitimacy of Chapter 19's dispute resolution mechanism.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Chapter 19 dispute resolution mechanism, which replaces ju-
dicial review of AD/CVD assessments with a binational panel review
system, was devised at the "eleventh-hour" of FTA negotiations to en-
sure Canada's participation in the free trade accord. Congressional ap-
proval of the panel review system in 1988, under "fast-track" analysis,
was premised upon several assumptions, some of which have been
called into question by subsequent events. The Reagan Administration
argued in 1988 that the system would have minimal impact on the
§ 1516a(g)(4)(H).
"The Coalition case is only the second constitutional challenge filed against
the FTA's dispute resolution mechanism. An earlier suit filed by the National
Council for Industrial Defense in August 1993 was dismissed because it was
erroneously filed in the District of Columbia District Court." 10 ITR 152.
251. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
252. See USTR Release, Dec. 15, 1994. The refund was expected to be between
approximately $450 and $575 million plus interest. II ITR 34 d 31. The first meeting
of the consultative body was scheduled for March 1, 1995. II ITR to d 45. The first
meeting was held in May. An extended consultation commenced July 7, 1995, in
Kelowna B.C. The U.S. government and the Coalition reported they were seeking sig-
nificant changes in the Canadian marketing system for Softwood Lumber to be re-
ported at the third meeting which is scheduled for September 1995. CALGARY HER-
ALD, 1995 WL 730856 (July 7, 1995).
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United States' adjudicatory regime because panels would hear few
cases and panelists from both countries share a common legal heritage
and would simply "apply" the existing AD/CVD law and applicable
standards of review of the importing country. The Softwood Lumber
case alone illustrates the naivet6 of the argument, and portends increas-
ing difficulties with the panel review system, the mechanism of choice
for dispute resolution in proliferating free trade accords to which the
United States is a signatory. It requires no prescience to anticipate that
increasing disparities in legal traditions and institutions of the member
nations in these accords will serve to intensify the problem of simply
"applying" the law of an importing nation. And the increasing number
of AD/CVD cases the widening free trade spheres will circumscribe
can only exacerbate the impact on American legal institutions. Addi-
tionally, the conclusion reached in 1988 that Chapter 19's panel review
mechanism is constitutional remains open to question. In particular, the
mechanism is vulnerable to the charge that it results in a rebalancing
or unbalancing of the relative powers of the three branches, thereby
running afoul of the Separation of Powers Doctrine.
Constitutional concerns aside, the problems which we can now per-
ceive arising from the Chapter 19 regime warrant a closer look at the
efficacy of the mechanism as currently crafted. At the outset, it must
be acknowledged that the strictures and exigencies of trade agreements
between competing sovereignties preclude the use of Article III courts
for judicial review, as a practical matter. Few importing nations would
agree to that arrangement. On the other hand, the normative standard
of independence which Article III establishes by way of its tenure and
salary protections could be adopted to great advantage. Indeed, these
protections might be seen as vitally important to dispute resolution
tribunals in the arena of international trade. Despite the benign trap-
pings of free trade accords, international trade remains a highly
politicized and contentious affair. The economic stakes are extremely
high. Absent some provisions for protecting the independence of bina-
tional trade tribunals they will be vulnerable to various influences
which could compromise their role. Perceptions of bias, conflicts of in-
terest, and political influence will undermine the legitimacy and effec-
tiveness of binational panels. As Hamilton reminds us
[p]eriodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomso-
ever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to [the tribu-
nals'] necessary independence. If the power of making them
was committed either to the executive or legislature there
would be danger of an improper complaisance to the branch
which possessed it; if to both, there would be an unwillingness
1995]
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to hazard the displeasure of either; if to the people or persons
chosen by them for the special purpose, there would be too
great a disposition to consult popularity to justify a reliance
that nothing would be consulted by the Constitution and the
laws.253
Simply put, the effectiveness of binational review tribunals would
be well served by the salary and tenure protections that secure the in-
dependence of Article III courts.
253. FEDERALIST No. 78 at 471 (Rossiter ed. 1961).
